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ABSTRACT
At the nation’s founding, search warrants and the concept of
suspicion were well entrenched as a means of limiting governmental
search power. This tradition largely explains why today’s Fourth
Amendment law includes two foundational black letter rules: the
presumptive warrant requirement and the presumptive suspicion
requirement.
Unfortunately, neither of these rules is correct. Certainly they have
historical support, especially in the common law. But whether they
reflect the totality of our historic experience is questionable, especially
when civil search practices are considered. More importantly,
modern developments—such as urban life and technological
advancements, the rise of the regulatory state, and post-9/11 security
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concerns—have sufficiently changed circumstances so that these
rules are now unworkable. Indeed, in today’s world these rules are
now demonstrably wrong. Worst of all, adhering to them has
prevented us from formulating a more coherent Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence.
This Article is a call to arms. It challenges us to recognize that a
new paradigm now confronts us, in which reasonableness serves as
the constitutional touchstone for all governmental searches, and
where neither warrants nor suspicion can be expected to serve as
primary mechanisms for protecting Fourth Amendment values.
Therefore, we must confront the need to identify new ways of
assuring adequate Fourth Amendment protections. To that end, the
Article concludes by offering some broad guidelines to start us on the
way.
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1. I will use the term “criminal searches” to refer to those searches whose primary
purpose is to uncover evidence of criminal wrongdoing, and the term “civil searches” to refer
to those having civil ends.
2. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment’s language is provided infra in
the text accompanying note 50.
INTRODUCTION
Suspicion is a siren. It has lured us into misguided Fourth
Amendment waters, obscuring a more rational search jurispru-
dence, not only in the criminal context, but particularly in the civil
context.1 We cling to the rule that suspicion generally is required
under the Reasonableness Clause, while ignoring that suspicion is
a core requirement only under the Warrant Clause, through its
reference to probable cause.2 Yet the Supreme Court, which has
correctly held that the Reasonableness Clause controls a civil
search’s constitutionality, continues to assure us that civil searches
generally should be based on some level of individualized suspicion
to be constitutional. Commentators, who commonly advocate for
stricter enforcement of the rule, do not help matters. In perpetuat-
ing this rule, we remain trapped by our jurisprudence’s inertia and
fail to correct toward a sound course.
Simply put, suspicion is not the primary determinant of a gov-
ernmental search’s constitutionality, whether the search is criminal
or civil in nature. Avoiding governmental overreaching is. Not all
suspicion-based searches are reasonable. Reasonableness depends
on many factors, such as the search’s scope and intrusiveness, all of
which help us determine whether the government exceeded its
constitutional bounds. Conversely, the vast majority of today’s
suspicionless searches—be they criminal or civil in nature—are
reasonable. These searches are perfectly constitutional so long as
they do not involve governmental overreaching. Nonetheless, as if
in a trance, we continue to assert loyalty to a suspicion-centered
search regime that leaves us marooned on an unstable juris-
prudential foundation. The rule has no grounding in the Fourth
Amendment’s text, a strong originalist case can be made against it,
and though it once served us well it has now become unworkable
due to modern developments.
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Our myopic focus upon suspicion has had two important
consequences—our adoption of a presumptive warrant requirement
and a presumptive suspicion requirement—each of which has
contributed to leading us astray. I will debunk the presumptive
warrant requirement in Part I and explain why it is an inaccurate
statement of black letter law in the criminal and civil contexts.
Part II is devoted to the presumptive suspicion requirement. It
notes that suspicion is not a textual requirement under the Fourth
Amendment, and further emphasizes that, during the Framers’
time, suspicion was not a universal requirement for valid searches.
The Framers, for example, statutorily authorized suspicionless
searches in the maritime customs context, and even extended such
search authority to homes and other buildings to enforce revenue
laws. Further, to the extent that suspicion was required, numerous
reasons exist for believing that it was often an illusory protection.
Among those reasons are that, though an articulated concept,
probable cause sentryship on the judiciary’s part was almost
certainly not fully developed at any point during the Framers’ era;
changes in language have likely resulted in probable cause having
a more demanding definition now than at the nation’s founding;
during the Framers’ era, numerous statutory obstacles existed to
accessing a search remedy; and evidence indicates that suspicionless
searches were allowed so long as they were successful. I close Part
II by explaining that we would do better to conceive of suspicion as
merely one proxy for protecting Fourth Amendment values, which
can also be protected using other mechanisms, sometimes more
effectively.
Finally, Part III argues that we are now confronted with a new
paradigm of judging Fourth Amendment reasonableness in the
absence of suspicion. This paradigm has been brought about by
numerous developments, including the reality of modern urban life
and technological advancements, the rise of the regulatory state,
and security concerns in the post-9/11 world. All of these develop-
ments have resulted in an increased interest—and sometimes a
need—to engage in preventative searches, such as for national
security purposes.
I conclude by suggesting some broad Fourth Amendment
guidelines that have distinct advantages over our current juris-
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3. See, e.g., Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996); Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 481 (1971); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); Camara
v. Mun. Ct., 387 U.S. 523, 528-29 (1967); Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 615 (1961);
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14-15 (1948).
4. See, e.g., Phyllis T. Bookspan, Reworking the Warrant Requirement: Resuscitating the
Fourth Amendment, 44 VAND. L. REV. 473, 530 (1991); Doriane Lambelet Coleman, Storming
the Castle To Save the Children: The Ironic Costs of a Child Welfare Exception to the Fourth
Amendment, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 413, 459, 522-26, 532 (2005); Joseph D. Grano,
Rethinking the Fourth Amendment Warrant Requirement, 19 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 603, 605 &
n.10 (1982); Wayne D. Holly, The Fourth Amendment Hangs in the Balance: Resurrecting the
Warrant Requirement Through Strict Scrutiny, 13 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 531, 540-41, 548-
54, 587 (1997).
5. See, e.g., Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1716 (2009); O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S.
709, 720 (1987); Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 454-55.
prudence. These guidelines replace the presumptive warrant and
suspicion requirements. They also go much further in fleshing
out—more accurately than in the current jurisprudence—a few
important Fourth Amendment principles. These guidelines have the
key advantage of charting a middle course, which avoids one
pervasive criticism of our present Fourth Amendment law, namely
that it manically swings between a formalistic, strict application of
the presumptive warrant and suspicion rules and an unbounded
balancing approach. The guidelines enjoy this advantage because
they provide explicit, discretion-limiting beacons that reflect core
Fourth Amendment values. They thus provide a starting point for
reformulating our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence so that it is
more honest, coherent, and accurate.
I. FALLACY OF THE PRESUMPTIVE WARRANT REQUIREMENT
The so-called black letter rule that the Constitution, through the
Fourth Amendment, imposes a presumptive warrant requirement
for governmental searches is commonly invoked by both courts3
and commentators.4 A common formulation of this rule is that,
except for certain carefully limited exceptions, searches must be
conducted under a valid warrant to be constitutional.5 The problem
with this rule is that it is untrue. In terms of the historical record,
the Framers did not include the Warrant Clause in the Fourth
Amendment to create a presumptive warrant requirement. Rather,
they included it to strictly limit the grounds upon which warrants
could issue. Further, this rule is a highly inaccurate description of
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6. See Grano, supra note 4, at 605 & n.10.
7. See Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1716.
8. See infra text accompanying note 50 for the Fourth Amendment’s language.
9. See Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 774
(1994) [hereinafter Amar, Fourth Amendment] (“The Warrant Clause says only when
warrants may not issue, not when they may, or must.”).
10. English legal doctrine had evolved to abhor general search warrants by no later than
the mid-1700s. See 2 SIR MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 150
(Sollom Emlyn ed., 1800) [hereinafter HALE 1800]; 2 SIR MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE
PLEAS OF THE CROWN 150 (Sollom Emlyn ed., photo. reprint 1971) (1736) [hereinafter HALE
1736]; 2 WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 82, 84 (4th ed. 1762)
[hereinafter HAWKINS 1762]; 2 WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN
82, 84 (3d ed. 1739) [hereinafter HAWKINS 1739]. During the same period, English common
law (in the famous Wilkes cases) had also begun to attack general search warrants. See infra
note 11. By independence, and certainly after the Fourth Amendment’s adoption, American
case law and legal doctrine had incorporated this disdain for general warrants. See Frisbie
v. Butler, 1 Kirby 213 (Conn. 1787); RICHARD BURN, ABRIDGMENT, OR THE AMERICAN JUSTICE
357 (1792) [hereinafter BURN 1792]; DANIEL DAVIS, A PRACTICAL TREATISE UPON THE
AUTHORITY AND DUTY OF JUSTICES OF THE PEACE IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS 47 (photo.
reprint 1994) (1824); RODOLPHUS DICKINSON, THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF JUSTICES OF THE
modern Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Thus, the Fourth
Amendment does not impose a presumptive warrant requirement
for either criminal or civil searches.
A. Criminal Context
The black letter presumptive warrant rule is not even true in the
criminal context, where it purportedly applies the most stringently.6
The reasons why this so-called rule is invalid in the criminal
context, while multifaceted, can be boiled down to two straight-
forward arguments: history and coherence.
Though still a prevailing view in current Supreme Court jurispru-
dence,7 any assertion that the Warrant Clause somehow generally
governs the constitutionality of criminal searches is contrary to a
proper historical understanding of why the Framers included it in
the Fourth Amendment. The Framers included the Warrant Clause
only to specify the limited grounds—probable cause, particularity,
and oath or affirmation8—upon which warrants can be granted,9
allowing future generations to weaken these restrictions only
through the difficult constitutional amendment process. The
Framers had multiple objectives in doing so. First, they consti-
tutionalized the common law ban on general warrants10 to ensure
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PEACE 253 (1818); JOHN A. DUNLAP, THE NEW-YORK JUSTICE 368 (1815); JAMES EWING, A
TREATISE ON THE OFFICE AND DUTY OF A JUSTICE OF THE PEACE 505 (1805); JOHN FAUCHERAUD
GRIMKÉ, THE SOUTH-CAROLINA JUSTICE OF PEACE 398 (3d ed. 1810); WILLIAM WALLER
HENING, THE NEW VIRGINIA JUSTICE 621 (3d ed. 1820) [hereinafter HENING, NEW VIRGINIA
JUSTICE 1820]; WILLIAM WALLER HENING, THE NEW VIRGINIA JUSTICE 413, 462, 464 (1799)
[hereinafter HENING, NEW VIRGINIA JUSTICE 1799]; WILLIAM WALLER HENING, THE NEW
VIRGINIA JUSTICE 450 (1795) [hereinafter HENING, NEW VIRGINIA JUSTICE 1795]; HENRY
HITCHCOCK, THE ALABAMA JUSTICE OF THE PEACE 407 (1822) [hereinafter HITCHCOCK, THE
ALABAMA JUSTICE]; FRANÇOIS-XAVIER MARTIN, THE OFFICE AND AUTHORITY OF A JUSTICE OF
THE PEACE 278, 280 (1791) [hereinafter MARTIN, OFFICE AND AUTHORITY]; A NEW CONDUCTOR
GENERALIS 404 (Albany, D. & S. Whiting 1803) [hereinafter NEW CONDUCTOR GENERALIS];
JAMES PARKER, THE CONDUCTOR GENERALIS 314-15, 360 (1801) [hereinafter PARKER,
CONDUCTOR GENERALIS]; HENRY POTTER, THE OFFICE AND DUTY OF A JUSTICE OF THE PEACE
273 (1816); RICHARD STARKE, THE OFFICE AND AUTHORITY OF A JUSTICE OF PEACE 351 (1774);
see also 2 RICHARD BACHE, THE MANUAL OF A PENNSYLVANIA JUSTICE OF THE PEACE 138-39
(1814); 7 NATHAN DANE, A GENERAL ABRIDGMENT AND DIGEST OF AMERICAN LAW 248-49, at
§ 2 (1824). See generally Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98
MICH. L. REV. 547, 655-57 & n.299 (1999) [hereinafter Davies, Original Fourth Amendment].
Through the Warrant Clause and its particularity requirement, the Framers consti-
tutionalized the unlawfulness of general warrants, thus doing everything they could to
prevent a return of general warrants. Cf. Davies, Original Fourth Amendment, supra, at 590
(“[T]he Framers adopted constitutional search and seizure provisions with the precise aim of
ensuring the protection of person and house by prohibiting legislative approval of general
warrants.”); id. at 657-60 (arguing that the Framers feared legislative approval of general
warrants for customs—but not criminal—searches); George C. Thomas, III, Time Travel,
Hovercrafts, and the Framers: James Madison Sees the Future and Rewrites the Fourth
Amendment, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1451, 1456 (2005) (contending that the Warrant Clause
was “[w]ritten to ensure that Congress could not authorize general searches”).
11. The Wilkes cases were famous litigations that occurred in Great Britain in the 1760s
and resulted in court rulings that for the first time cast doubt upon the legality of general
warrants. See Fabio Arcila, Jr., In the Trenches: Searches and the Misunderstood Common-
Law History of Suspicion and Probable Cause, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 14 n.41 (2007)
[hereinafter Arcila, In the Trenches]. In the Wilkes cases, officials who had operated under
general warrants were held liable for damages in trespass. Money v. Leach, (1765) 97 Eng.
Rep. 1075, 1075, 1077, 3 Burr. 1742, 1742, 1745, 19 How. St. Tri. 1001, 1003, 1006 (K.B.)
(^2,000 in damages claimed; jury awarded ^400); Entick v. Carrington, (1765) 95 Eng. Rep.
807, 808, 811, 19 How. St. Tri. 1029, 1030, 1036, 2 Wils. K.B. 275, 275, 280 (C.P.) (^2,000 in
damages claimed; jury awarded ^300); Beardmore v. Carrington, (1764) 95 Eng. Rep. 790,
790-91, 793-94 (C.P.) (^10,000 in damages claimed; jury awarded ^1,000); Huckle v. Money,
(1763) 95 Eng. Rep. 768, 768-69 (C.P.) (plaintiff “suffered very little or no damages ... perhaps
[^20] would have been thought damages sufficient,” yet jury awarded ^ 300); Wilkes v. Wood,
(1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489, 489, 499, 19 How. St. Tri. 1153, 1153, 1168 (C.P.) (^5,000 in damages
claimed; jury awarded ^1,000); see also Wilkes v. Wood, 19 How. St. Tri. 1381, 1407-08
(reporting that, in litigation Wilkes brought against Secretary of State Lord Halifax, who had
issued the general warrants, Wilkes had claimed ^ 20,000 in damages, with the jury awarding
that only specific warrants could issue, thereby ensuring that the
general warrants that had been used to oppressive ends in Great
Britain—most infamously in the Wilkes cases11—could not be
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him ^4,000). See generally NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 43-48 (Leonard W. Levy ed., Da
Capo Press 1970) (1937). A concurring justice in Huckle v. Money noted that the court was
essentially reviewing a “motion to set aside 15 verdicts ... ; for all the other persons who have
brought actions against these [searchers] have had verdicts for [^200] in each cause by
consent.” (1763) 95 Eng. Rep. 768, 769 (C.P.) (Bathurst, J., concurring). The actions were
costly to the government, and not just because of the damages granted. “The government
undertook the responsibility of defending all actions arising from the warrant and the
payment of all judgments. The expenses incurred were said to total ^ 100,000.” LASSON, supra,
at 45 (citation omitted).
The Wilkes cases were widely publicized in the colonies and ubiquitously discussed in
Framing-era American cases and justice manuals. E.g., Grumon v. Raymond, 1 Conn. 40, 42-
44 (1814) (citing and discussing Entick v. Carrington and Lord Halifax’s warrants); Bell v.
Clapp, 10 Johns. 263, 265-66 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1813) (citing and discussing Entick); DUNLAP,
supra note 10, at 370 (discussing and citing Entick); HENING, NEW VIRGINIA JUSTICE 1795,
supra note 10, at 404 (discussing both Wilkes and Entick); HITCHCOCK,THE ALABAMA JUSTICE,
supra note 10, at 408-09 (discussing and citing Wilkes and Entick). See generally Amar, Fourth
Amendment, supra note 9, at 772 & n.54; Arcila, In the Trenches, supra, at 28 & n.96
(recounting citations and discussions of Money v. Leach); Davies, Original Fourth Amendment,
supra note 10, at 562-65 & nn.21-25. They were also widely discussed in English treatises that
Americans likely consulted. E.g., 2 SERJEANT WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS
OF THE CROWN 131 n.2, 135 n.6, 138 n.7, 181 nn.3-4 (Thomas Leach ed., 6th ed. 1787)
[hereinafter HAWKINS 1787]. The Supreme Court has described Entick as “a ‘monument of
English freedom’ ‘undoubtedly familiar’ to ‘every American statesman’ at the time the
Constitution was adopted, and considered to be ‘the true and ultimate expression of
constitutional law.’” Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596 (1989) (quoting Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616, 626 (1886)); accord Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 49 (1967).
12. See TELFORD TAYLOR, TWO STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 43 (1969).
13. Colonial hostility to these searches was particularly acute in Massachusetts, where
colonial merchants litigated against the writs of assistance. Fabio Arcila, Jr., A Response to
Professor Steinberg’s Fourth Amendment Chutzpah, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1229, 1244 (2008)
[hereinafter Arcila, Fourth Amendment Chutzpah]. It is generally thought that this litigation
had an impact upon colonial thinking about search and seizure protections, though this
position has been disputed. Id. at 1243-44 & nn.46-47. For an overview of writs of assistance,
see Arcila, In the Trenches, supra note 11, at 10-12 (explaining that the writs did not provide
any search authority in themselves, but colonial customs officers claimed to be statutorily
authorized to search as part of their commissions).
used in the new nation. As Professor Taylor has explained, the
Framers “did not prohibit as unreasonable all searches not covered
by warrants issued in compliance with the second clause” because
“their prime purpose was to prohibit the oppressive use of war-
rants.”12 Second, they sought to avoid any repeat of the colonial
practice in which crown authorities had resorted to laxly issued
writs of assistance to help justify their customs searches.13 Being
familiar with the abuses that accompanied writs of assistance, the
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14. Amar, Fourth Amendment, supra note 9, at 782 (“[T]he Framers did not mind
‘discourag[ing] resort to ... a warrant.’ They wanted to limit this imperial and ex parte device,
so they insisted on a substantial standard of proof....” (quoting Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S.
560, 566 (1971))).
15. Major British treatises expressed concern regarding the discretion that general
warrants conferred. E.g., 2 HAWKINS 1787, supra note 11, at 132; 2 HAWKINS 1762, supra note
10, at 82; 2 HAWKINS 1739, supra note 10, at 82; 2 WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE
PLEAS OF THE CROWN 82 (1721) [hereinafter HAWKINS 1721]. American justice of the peace
manuals did likewise. E.g., RICHARD BURN, AN ABRIDGMENT OF BURN’S JUSTICE OF THE PEACE
AND PARISH OFFICER 322-23 (Boston, Joseph Greenleaf 1773) [hereinafter BURN’S JUSTICE OF
THE PEACE ABRIDGMENT 1773]; DAVIS, supra note 10, at 47; GRIMKÉ, supra note 10, at 398;
PARKER, CONDUCTOR GENERALIS, supra note 10, at 315; POTTER, supra note 10, at 273. Davies
has noted a “consistent” concern with the discretionary authority that general warrants
offered. See generally Davies, Original Fourth Amendment, supra note 10, at 578-82. He
agrees that “general warrants were ‘unreasonable’ precisely because they bestowed
discretionary arrest and search authority on ordinary peace officers.” Thomas Y. Davies,
Correcting Search-and-Seizure History: Now-Forgotten Common-Law Warrantless Arrest
Standards and the Original Understanding of “Due Process of Law,” 77 MISS. L.J. 1, 5 (2007)
[hereinafter Davies, Correcting History].
16. Professor Amar is the strongest proponent of the view that the Framers were hostile
to warrants because of their immunizing effect. See Amar, Fourth Amendment, supra note 9,
at 771-72, 774, 779; Akhil Reed Amar, The Fourth Amendment, Boston, and the Writs of
Assistance, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 53, 60 (1996) [hereinafter Amar, Writs of Assistance]; see
also Gerard V. Bradley, The Constitutional Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 38 DEPAUL L.
REV. 817, 844 (1989). In opposition, Professor Davies believes that the Framers were hostile
only to general warrants but favored specific warrants. Davies, Original Fourth Amendment,
supra note 10, at 584-85. Davies agrees that specific warrants immunized the searcher but
he greatly discounts the importance Amar places on this feature. See id. at 588-89.
Both Amar and Davies make valid points. However, in general, Davies improperly
discounts the Framers’ concern about the state’s warrant power. Davies is right that, if
anything, the Framers favored the use of specific warrants, having often provided for their
use when granting search power. See Fabio Arcila, Jr., Special Needs and Special Deference:
Suspicionless Civil Searches in the Modern Regulatory State, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1223, 1238
& nn.71-72 (2004) [hereinafter Arcila, Special Needs]. But if Davies means to assert that the
Framers therefore were unconcerned about specific warrants, he is mistaken. The following
passage is instructive in this regard:
All the checks which the English law, and which even the constitution of the
United States, have imposed upon the operation of these search warrants, and
with the manifestation of a strong jealousy of the abuses incident to them, would
Framers believed that both probable cause14 and particularity
should support any search authorized under legal process. The
Framers’ key concern behind their desire to ban general warrants
and writs of assistance was to limit search discretion,15 and
requiring both probable cause and particularity served that end.
Third, the Framers sought to limit access to warrants because
they immunized officers from suits challenging the propriety of
their searches.16 The Framers accomplished this goal through the
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scarcely have been thought of, or have been deemed necessary, if the warrant
did not communicate the power of opening the outer door of a house. 
Bell v. Clapp, 10 Johns. 263, 266 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1813) (emphasis added). The court was
discussing specific search warrants, so its reference to “the operation of these search
warrants” was a reference to the operation of specific search warrants. See id. at 265. In this
passage the court is discussing the immunizing effect of specific search warrants even when
doors have been broken, which shows that there was a contemporary concern even with
specific search warrants. This explains the court’s implicit reference to the Fourth
Amendment and its explicit mention of the Framers’ “manifestation of a strong jealousy of the
abuses incident to them [i.e., specific search warrants].” See id. at 265.
Because general search warrants were illegal as a matter of legal doctrine, see supra note
10, they should have had no immunizing power. (Davies has reached the same conclusion. See
Davies, Original Fourth Amendment, supra note 10, at 588 & n.99.) This was indeed the case,
though unfortunately the majority of Framing-era treatises were not as clear on the matter
as they could have been.
These treatises usually indicated that “warrants” immunized an officer who had searched,
but failed to mention whether the warrant had to be specific or could be general. See BURN
1792, supra note 10, at 358-59 (indicating that warrant immunized officer for breaking door,
with no mention of whether the warrant had to be specific or could be general, but clarifying
that the warrant immunized informer regarding broken door only if search successful); accord
7 DANE, supra note 10, at 245 & n.*; DUNLAP, supra note 10, at 370-71; EWING, supra note 10,
at 128, 506; GRIMKÉ, supra note 10, at 399; HENING, NEW VIRGINIA JUSTICE 1799, supra note
10, at 40, 414; NEW CONDUCTOR GENERALIS, supra note 10, at 405; see also MARTIN, OFFICE
AND AUTHORITY, supra note 10, at 279 (indicating, in passage apparently applying to arrests,
that warrant will justify officer though justice of peace “commit[ted] a mistake,” so long as
warrant within justice of peace’s jurisdiction and “legally cognizable before him”). However,
because (as indicated supra note 10) these treatises had elsewhere explained that general
warrants were illegal, one would expect any sound lawyer or judge to understand that such
warrants lacked any immunizing power.
I have found only one Framing-era justice manual that explicitly limited the immunity
principle to specific search warrants. It indicated that immunity was limited to warrants
“regularly granted, and specifically directed.” DAVIS, supra note 10, at 75. Elsewhere,
however, even this justice manual was not so careful in distinguishing between the
immunizing effects of general versus specific search warrants. See id. at 47-48 (indicating that
warrant immunized officer for breaking door, with no mention of whether warrant had to be
specific or could be general).
Regardless of the opacity in most Framing-era legal publications regarding the issue,
American cases from the period show that the common law had recognized that general
warrants lacked an immunizing effect. For example, in an 1814 case a Connecticut court
declared that an official who had searched under a general warrant was liable, explaining
that:
an officer is not always liable when he executes an improper warrant ... where
it does not appear on the face of the warrant that it is illegal.... But an officer is
bound to know the law; and when the warrant, on the face of it, appears to be
illegal, and he executes it, he is liable to the person arrested. Such was the
present case.
Grumon v. Raymond, 1 Conn. 40, 47-48 (1814).
It is not surprising that early American case law absorbed this doctrine given that it was
a primary lesson from the series of Wilkes cases in England. See Davies, Original Fourth
1286 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:1275
Amendment, supra note 10, at 655. Indeed, Grumon relies heavily on several of the Wilkes
decisions. See 1 Conn. at 43, 45.
Because the illegality of general warrants was well established, it seems improbable that
the Framers would have been concerned about general warrants having an immunizing effect.
The more likely objection, evidenced in American justice manuals, would have been to the
discretion that general warrants provided a searcher. See supra note 15.
17. See supra text accompanying note 8.
18. See, e.g., Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006); Kyllo v. United
States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980); Agnello v.
United States, 269 U.S. 20, 33 (1925).
19. 2 HALE 1800, supra note 10, at 102-03; 2 HALE 1736, supra note 10, at 102-03.
20. 2 HALE 1800, supra note 10, at 102-03; 2 HALE 1736, supra note 10, at 102-03.
21. 2 HAWKINS 1787, supra note 11, at 139; accord 2 HAWKINS 1762, supra note 10, at 86-
87; 2 HAWKINS 1739, supra note 10, at 86-87.
22. See Amar, Fourth Amendment, supra note 9, at 764-69.
Warrant Clause’s three requirements,17 all of which constitute
obstacles that must be overcome before a warrant may issue.
Furthermore, though it is often said that warrants have special
applicability to homes,18 during the Framing era warrants were not
always necessary for home searches. A famous treatise indicated
that, in what today would be considered an exigent circumstance
exception to a warrant requirement, the common law authorized
private homes to be searched for felons on hue and cry, merely upon
suspicion.19 Even forcible entry was allowed on such hue and cry,
though it was justified only if the felon was present.20 Another
leading treatise authorized warrantless entry into private homes to
pursue known felons or to “suppress” an “affray” occurring “in the
view or hearing of a constable.”21
Even putting history aside, Professor Amar has shown that any
assertion that criminal search constitutionality is usually governed
by reference to the Warrant Clause makes no sense in the real
world. Adhering to this incorrect proposition has left us with an
emasculated and meaningless governing principle as more and more
exceptions are added in a futile effort to save the rule. The cata-
logues of these exceptions are readily found. Professor Amar’s
partial list includes searches incident to arrest, searches under
various exigent circumstances, consent searches, and plain view
searches.22 Other additions to this list include stop and frisk
searches and automobile searches, among others that the leading
2010] THE DEATH OF SUSPICION 1287
23. See 6 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
965-66 (4th ed. 2004) (Index, “Warrantless Searches” entry).
24. I am certainly not the only person to have made this observation. E.g., California v.
Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (complaining that “the ‘warrant
requirement’ ha[s] become so riddled with exceptions that it [is] basically unrecognizable”);
Bookspan, supra note 4, at 501; Stephen A. Saltzburg, The Fourth Amendment: Internal
Revenue Code or Body of Principles?, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 956, 957-58 (2006); William J.
Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth Amendment Remedies, 77 VA. L. REV. 881, 882 (1991).
25. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2006) (prohibiting warrantless interception and disclosure of
wire, oral, or electronic communications); 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2006) (requiring warrant for
government to obtain disclosure from electronic communications service provider); Illinois v.
Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181 (1990) (“The Fourth Amendment generally prohibits the
warrantless entry of a person’s home, whether to make an arrest or to search for specific
objects.”); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980) (“It is a basic principle of Fourth
Amendment law that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are
presumptively unreasonable.” (internal quotations and citation omitted)); Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 356-57 (1967) (requiring search warrant for electronic aural
surveillance); Stuntz, supra note 24, at 922. Indeed, the Supreme Court’s disinclination to
require the use of search warrants has been recognized for decades. See Robert M. Bloom, The
Supreme Court and Its Purported Preference for Search Warrants, 50 TENN. L. REV. 231, 235-
36, 259-61 & n.205 (1983). The Court’s seemingly inexorable trend towards limiting a warrant
requirement has continued. For example, it has rejected a warrant requirement for a search
of containers on a bus after obtaining consent, but under circumstances in which (despite the
Court’s holding to the contrary) individuals likely would not have felt free to deny consent or
to leave the bus, United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194 (2002); for a search of a bag located
in a car’s trunk, California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991); for the seizure of evidence in plain
view, even when its discovery was not inadvertent because the officer had intended to look for
evidence other than what was specified in a search warrant, Horton v. California, 496 U.S.
128 (1990); and also for the search of an occupied motor home, California v. Carney, 471 U.S.
386 (1985). Recently, the Supreme Court may have expressed recognition that this trend has
extended too far, and attempted to swing the pendulum back toward a more meaningful
warrant requirement for at least some car searches. See Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710
(2009) (search of vehicle incident to arrest is allowed only if arrestee is unsecured and within
reaching distance of passenger compartment, or if it is “reasonable to believe” that evidence
of arresting offense might be in vehicle).
treatise identifies in an even more exhaustive list of exceptions to
a purported warrant “requirement.”23
At some point, the list of “carefully defined exceptions” to a
presumptive warrant rule can grow so large that the rule itself is no
longer valid. It is easy to conclude that we have reached that point.24
In criminal investigations today, warrants are required principally
only for searches of premises or communications.25 Police and other
state and federal law enforcement officers know they can conduct
most other criminal searches without a warrant. All these excep-
tions to a presumptive warrant requirement in the criminal search
context reveal the invalidity of the purported rule.
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26. See Amar, Fourth Amendment, supra note 9, at 771.
27. A prime example of this principle can be seen in the differing levels of protection
afforded to the home depending upon whether a search is criminal or civil in nature. Entry
into the home to conduct a criminal search generally requires a warrant. See Agnello v.
United States, 269 U.S. 20, 33 (1925). Entry into the home to conduct a civil search need not
be authorized by a warrant, or even justified by suspicion. See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S.
868, 880 (1987); Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 318-24 (1971).
I recognize that this principle is debatable, as there have been instances when Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence has been criticized for extending more protections to criminals
than law-abiding persons. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 530 (1967) (“It is
surely anomalous to say that the individual and his private property are fully protected by the
Fourth Amendment only when the individual is suspected of criminal behavior.”); Wayne R.
LaFave, Administrative Searches and the Fourth Amendment: The Camara and See Cases,
1967 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 18. For example, during an earlier period the Supreme Court indicated
that the Fourth Amendment extended more protection against criminal than civil searches.
See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978) (explaining that, prior to Camara, 387 U.S.
523, “[e]ntries upon property for civil purposes, where the occupant was suspected of no
criminal conduct whatsoever, involved a more peripheral concern and the less intense ‘right
to be secure from intrusion into personal privacy’” (quoting Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360,
365 (1959))). The principle I assert in the text accompanying this note is vulnerable to the
same critique.
The critique, however, is facile. It compares apples (criminals) to oranges (law-abiding
persons), rather than considering the proper comparison between a presumptively law-abiding
person seeking protection from either a criminal or civil search. This apples-to-oranges
comparison is thus invalid because it draws a distinction on a basis as to which the Fourth
Amendment is agnostic: the blameworthiness of the search target. The Fourth Amendment
extends the same protections regardless of whether the search target engaged in wrongdoing.
To read in a warrant requirement that is not in the text—and
then to read in various nontextual exceptions to that so-called
requirement—is not to read the Fourth Amendment at all. It is
to rewrite it....
... [T]he Framers did say what they meant, and what they
said makes eminent good sense: all searches and seizures must
be reasonable. Precisely because these searches and seizures can
occur in all shapes and sizes under a wide variety of circum-
stances, the Framers chose a suitably general command.26
B. Civil Context
The argument against any presumptive warrant requirement for
criminal searches, which is set forth in the immediately preceding
section, seals the case against any such requirement for civil
searches. Fourth Amendment protections are at their highest in
criminal cases as a proportional safeguard against the government’s
penal power.27 Therefore, if the Warrant Clause does not govern the
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See Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 109-10 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Florida v.
Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 519 n.4 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23,
33 (1963); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 453 (1948). Thus, a more valid measure
considers the punitive scope of the power that the government is bringing to bear in a
particular case. My assertion rests on what should be a largely uncontroversial principle: as
a general matter, government’s power through criminal law enforcement to completely
deprive a person of freedom should be subject to greater checks than its lesser power in the
civil context to partially infringe upon that freedom.
28. Amar, Fourth Amendment, supra note 9, at 771 (emphasis added).
29. For example, Professor Amar uses several civil search examples in his argument
against measuring the constitutionality of searches by reference to the Warrant Clause. He
discusses the Framers’ passage of statutes authorizing civil searches of maritime vessels for
regulatory purposes at the border. See id. at 766. Other examples he points to are the
extensive “real-life, unintrusive, nondiscriminatory searches” that routinely occur, such as
“metal detectors at airports, annual auto emissions tests, inspections of closely regulated
industries, public school regimens, border searches, and on and on,” all of which would become
unconstitutional if the Warrant Clause were applied. Id. at 769-70. To erase any doubt as to
his opinion, he emphasizes that “[t]he text of the [Fourth] Amendment applies equally to both
civil and criminal law.” Id. at 770 & n.45.
30. E.g., Act of May 6, 1822, ch. 58, § 2, 3 Stat. 682, 682 (granting “Indian agents”
authority to conduct warrantless searches of traders “upon suspicion or information that
ardent spirits are carried into the Indian countries”); Act of Mar. 3, 1815, ch. 94, § 2, 3 Stat.
231, 232 (granting authority to customs officials to stop and search “any carriage or vehicle
... and ... any person travelling on foot, or beast of burden” for illegal goods upon suspicion);
Act of Feb. 4, 1815, ch. 31, §§ 2, 4, 3 Stat. 195, 195-96 (same); Act of Apr. 25, 1808, ch. 66, § 7,
2 Stat. 499, 501 (authorizing warrantless but suspicion-based search of maritime vessels to
enforce embargo laws); Act of Mar. 2, 1799, ch. 22, §§ 67-68, 1 Stat. 627, 677-78 (“That it shall
be lawful for the collector, naval officer, or other officer of the customs, after entry made of
any goods, wares or merchandise, on suspicion of fraud, to open and examine....”); Act of Aug.
4, 1790, ch. 35, §§ 46-48, 1 Stat. 145, 169-70 (providing for the search and seizure, upon
suspicion, of goods subject to duty); Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, §§ 22-24, 1 Stat. 29, 42-43
(giving customs officials search and seizure powers upon suspicion of fraud in the collection
of duties); see also infra notes 105-10 and accompanying text (discussing warrantless search
provisions of Hamilton’s 1791 Excise Act); infra note 125.
constitutionality of criminal searches, certainly it cannot govern the
constitutionality of civil searches. Professor Amar makes this
implication clear with his simple declaration that “all searches and
seizures must be reasonable.”28 Indeed, though he concentrates
heavily on criminal searches in his argument, he certainly believes
that the same argument extends to civil searches.29
The rule’s invalidity in the civil context also can be shown both in
terms of an originalist analysis and in terms of our modern Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. From an originalist perspective, numer-
ous federal statutes from the Framers’ era authorized warrantless
civil searches.30 These statutes evidence that neither the Framers
nor other political leaders from their generation believed that a
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31. See infra notes 238-43 and accompanying text.
32. See 387 U.S. 523, 528-29, 534 (1967).
33. 387 U.S. 541, 542 (1967).
34. Camara, 387 U.S. at 538; see also Thomas K. Clancy, The Fourth Amendment’s
Concept of Reasonableness, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 977, 1007-08 [hereinafter Clancy, Fourth
Amendment Reasonableness] (describing the Camara Court, using a poetic oxymoron, as
having “created a nonindividualized concept of probable cause,” which “was certainly not the
traditionally accepted meaning of the probable cause standard”).
35. David A. Sklansky, The Fourth Amendment and Common Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV.
1739, 1813 (2000).
warrant was usually required for a valid search. To the contrary, in
numerous instances they believed that searches could be perfectly
legal even absent a warrant. Despite being repeatedly pummeled
with the black letter presumptive warrant rule, we continue to
believe the same thing today. In context after context, we are
content to submit each other, and even ourselves, to warrantless
civil searches.31
For those unconvinced by the preceding argument, consider the
incoherence that results from a generalized warrant requirement for
civil searches. A primary example is the administrative warrant. In
1967 the Supreme Court, in Camara v. Municipal Court, constitu-
tionally mandated such warrants for municipal housing inspections,
at a time when it was still professing that the Warrant Clause
usually governed the constitutionality of civil searches.32 The Court
extended this administrative warrant regime to commercial
premises in See v. City of Seattle, a companion case decided the
same day.33
Though the Supreme Court in Camara and See mandated the use
of warrants, it did not really mean it, at least not in a valid constitu-
tional sense. This is clear from the nature of the warrants that it
mandated. According to the Camara Court, housing inspectors are
constitutionally required to obtain warrants, but those warrants can
be issued on a make-believe version of probable cause based upon
factors such as condition of the area, the amount of time passed
since the last inspection, or the condition of the building.34
Such administrative warrants have rightly been called
“freakish,”35 and should be offensive to both Reasonableness Clause
and Warrant Clause adherents. Reasonableness Clause adherents
should object to the conflation of Fourth Amendment reasonableness
with the Warrant Clause’s requirements. Probable cause and
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36. Scott E. Sundby, A Return to Fourth Amendment Basics: Undoing the Mischief of
Camara and Terry, 72 MINN. L. REV. 383, 426 (1988).
37. Id. at 393.
38. Id. at 394.
39. TAYLOR, supra note 12, at 98.
40. Barry J. Stern, Warrants Without Probable Cause, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 1385, 1399
(1994); see also Bookspan, supra note 4, at 506-07 & n.178; Silas Wasserstrom & Louis M.
Seidman, The Fourth Amendment as Constitutional Theory, 77 GEO. L.J. 19, 25-26 (1988).
Camara’s validation of a lower probable cause standard applicable to the issuance of
administrative warrants as opposed to warrants issued in the criminal context also led to
criticisms that the Court’s Fourth Amendment civil search jurisprudence was extending
greater rights to criminals than the law-abiding public. See, e.g., Kevin I. MacKenzie, Note,
Administrative Searches and the Fourth Amendment: An Alternative to the Warrant
Requirement, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 856, 863 (1979); Note, Rationalizing Administrative
Searches, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1291, 1325 (1979).
41. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538 (1967).
42. Bookspan, supra note 4, at 506; Wasserstrom & Seidman, supra note 40, at 25-26.
particularity, for example, are distinct aspects of reasonableness,
and are textually required only when the Warrant Clause is
implicated. But the Court’s approach in Camara and See short-
circuits this analysis, suggesting that reasonableness is present if
the Warrant Clause is purportedly satisfied.
Camara’s administrative warrants also should upset Warrant
Clause adherents. One objectionable feature is that the Camara
Court’s approach “altered probable cause’s meaning.”36 Under
Camara, “probable cause was recast as standing for a broader
concept of reasonableness based on a weighing of the governmental
and individual interests.”37 “Instead of probable cause defining a
reasonable search,” as would be the case if the Warrant Clause
really served as the constitutional touchstone, “after Camara,
reasonableness, in the form of a balancing test, defined probable
cause.”38 The result is that Camara has been long criticized for
“degrad[ing]”39 the Warrant Clause because it “allow[s] warrants to
issue without particularized suspicion, therefore ... sanctioning the
same type of general warrant that led to the Amendment’s adop-
tion.”40 Camara also is objectionable because it authorizes the use
of administrative warrants to justify area searches.41 As such, it
does violence to the Warrant Clause’s particularity requirement.42
No one devoted to a coherent Fourth Amendment jurisprudence can
be satisfied with Camara’s and See’s administrative warrant
requirement.
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43. The Supreme Court was implicitly addressing this point when it wrote in another
administrative warrant case that:
[a] warrant ... provide[s] assurances from a neutral officer that the inspection is
reasonable under the Constitution, is authorized by statute, and is pursuant to
an administrative plan containing specific neutral criteria. Also, a warrant
would then and there advise the owner of the scope and objects of the search,
beyond which limits the inspector is not expected to proceed.
Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 323 (1978) (citation omitted); see also Stephen J.
Schulhofer, On the Fourth Amendment Rights of the Law-Abiding Public, 1989 SUP. CT. REV.
87; Stern, supra note 40, at 1400. The Supreme Court has noted that limiting discretion is a
core Fourth Amendment concern. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-55 (1979).
44. Stern, supra note 40, at 1402. In defending Camara, Stern advocates for the issuance
of warrants on less than probable cause (in his words, “variable probable cause,” which might
amount to nothing more than “reasonable suspicion”). See id. at 1402-03.
45. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
To be more charitable, the majorities in Camara and See were
seeking to uphold important Fourth Amendment values. Unfortu-
nately, their analytic failures led them into flawed reasoning. The
value of the regulatory warrants that Camara and See demanded,
which essentially allow suspicionless searches, is obviously not to
assure the satisfaction of some threshold level of individualized
suspicion. Rather, the Court adopted them to promote another
Fourth Amendment interest: limiting the government’s discretion
in executing searches.43 This is undoubtedly a benefit of the Camara
ruling.
Accordingly, the decision has been defended, but on a misguided
basis that only perpetuates Fourth Amendment incoherence. One
commentator has praised Camara because “[a]n absolute prohibi-
tion on the use of warrants in this instance would have been
intolerable to the framers whose purpose in adopting the Fourth
Amendment was to protect against the invasion of privacy by
executive officers acting with unbridled discretion.”44 But this view
mistakenly defends Camara’s fractured Fourth Amendment benefit
based on at least two fundamental misunderstandings of the
Framers’ intent. First, prohibiting the use of warrants in this
situation would not have been intolerable to the Framers. To the
contrary, prohibiting these sorts of warrants was precisely what the
Framers sought to accomplish through the Fourth Amendment, out
of a concern about warrants’ immunizing effects.45 Second, the
Framers understood that core Fourth Amendment values, such as
limiting governmental discretion, could be protected through means
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46. See Fabio Arcila, Jr., The Framers’ Search Power: The Misunderstood Statutory
History of Suspicion & Probable Cause, 50 B.C. L. REV. 363, 403-05 & n.200 (2009)
[hereinafter Arcila, The Framers’ Search Power] (noting that Hamilton’s 1791 Excise Act
returned a probable cause/immunity issue to the jury to address anti-Federalist rhetoric).
47. See Thomas K. Clancy, The Role of Individualized Suspicion in Assessing the
Reasonableness of Searches and Seizures, 25 U. MEM. L. REV. 483, 603 (1994).
48. E.g., City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000); Chandler v. Miller, 520
U.S. 305, 308, 313 (1997).
49. See supra note 30; infra note 92.
other than warrants, such as through a properly designed regula-
tory framework.46 Thus, though Camara’s outcome in upholding the
searches can rightly be justified on a necessity theory,47 its reason-
ing cannot.
II. FALLACY OF THE PRESUMPTIVE SUSPICION REQUIREMENT
It is a familiar proposition that the Fourth Amendment generally
requires searches to be premised upon suspicion, and indeed the
Supreme Court repeatedly has assured us that this is so.48
Originalism explains part of our attraction to this rule, as the
temptation to claim an originalist presumptive suspicion require-
ment is great. Such a claim can be based, for instance, upon the
preponderance of civil search statutes from our nation’s early
history that facially required prior suspicion.49 There are, however,
at least two fundamental problems with this presumptive suspicion
requirement. First, it has no grounding in the Fourth Amendment’s
text. Second, it is demonstrably overbroad, as shown by colonial and
early federal exceptions to prior suspicion requirements. Thus, even
originalism may undermine any presumptive suspicion require-
ment.
A. The Fourth Amendment’s Text
To correctly understand suspicion’s role in Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence requires us to recognize that (1) it is only in the
Warrant Clause that the Fourth Amendment explicitly addresses
the concept of suspicion, through its probable cause requirement;
and (2) because there is no presumptive warrant requirement, it is
the Reasonableness Clause that governs the constitutionality of
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50. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
51. See supra text accompanying notes 8-17.
both criminal and civil searches. When combined, these propositions
inescapably belie any presumptive suspicion requirement.
As is well known, the Fourth Amendment is comprised of two
clauses, the Reasonableness Clause—
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated ...
and the Warrant Clause—
... and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.50
The Reasonableness Clause contains no reference to suspicion of any
kind. Rather, it simply declares that people and their property are
protected against unreasonable searches. Only the Warrant Clause
contains any textual support for a suspicion requirement, and that
only implicitly, through its probable cause requirement. Thus, from
a purely textual standpoint, the instances in which suspicion is an
absolute requirement for the constitutionality of a search exist
only when the Warrant Clause and its probable cause requirement
are implicated. Consequently—and, again, from a purely textual
standpoint—suspicion is a constitutional requirement only to the
extent a warrant is required to validate a given search. It is only
when a warrant-based search is at issue that suspicion is always
required to assure that the search meets constitutional standards.
The Framers never intended for the Fourth Amendment to
impose any generalized suspicion requirement. Anyone with an
impulse to the contrary has simply been brainwashed by the
repeated mantra that the Fourth Amendment generally does re-
quire suspicion. To the contrary, the Fourth Amendment’s history
demonstrates that the Framers did not intend for the Warrant
Clause to impose a generalized Fourth Amendment probable cause
or suspicion requirement. Rather, they included the Warrant Clause
in the Fourth Amendment for more limited reasons, among them to
assure that warrants could issue only under probable cause.51 But,
of course, to declare that probable cause must support all warrants
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52. See infra notes 238-43 and accompanying text.
53. Amar, Fourth Amendment, supra note 9, at 782-85.
54. See supra text accompanying notes 8-17.
55. See infra text accompanying notes 211-43.
56. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
57. 3 U.S. 266 (1973).
is not to say that probable cause or some other level of suspicion
generally must support all searches. The vast majority of searches,
after all, do not require a validating warrant.52 Professor Amar has,
again, beautifully made this argument in more detail,53 and thus I
will not give it further attention here.
Having eliminated the Warrant Clause as the source for the
purported Fourth Amendment presumptive suspicion requirement,
the only other available source is the Reasonableness Clause. The
Framers, after all, adopted the Warrant Clause to accomplish a
specific number of limited objectives.54 Imposing a presumptive
suspicion rule was not one of them. With the Warrant Clause
eliminated, the only other textual source for constitutional search
and seizure protections is the Reasonableness Clause. Thus, it must
be the Reasonableness Clause that governs the constitutionality of all
searches, both criminal and civil. But the Reasonableness Clause
must cover too many situations to impose a presumptive suspicion
rule.55 Even more fundamentally, the Reasonableness Clause says
nothing about suspicion—when it is required, when it is not—and
thus as a textual matter provides no support for a presumptive
suspicion rule.56
Though this textual analysis is quite straightforward, it has not
saved our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence from a torturous
developmental history, one that has impacted our view of suspicion.
For a good part of the last century, the question of how the Fourth
Amendment’s two clauses interact to govern a search’s constitution-
ality divided the Supreme Court. This question was once the subject
of a raging debate concerning the extent to which searches can be
constitutional solely under the Reasonableness Clause, or whether
the Warrant Clause provides the measure of a search’s constitution-
ality. The Supreme Court’s warring opinions in Almeida-Sanchez v.
United States exemplified this debate.57 Though it is not yet clear
that this debate has been completely resolved, it has now waned, at
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58. The debate among scholars remains spirited. Compare TAYLOR, supra note 12, at 43-
44, 46-47 (arguing that reasonableness is the ultimate constitutional touchstone for
governmental searches, which need not always comply with the Warrant Clause), and Amar,
Fourth Amendment, supra note 9, at 761-71 (same), with Davies, Original Fourth Amendment,
supra note 10, at 591-600, 736-40 (arguing that originalism supports a variant of presumptive
warrant requirement, and discredits generalized reasonableness approach), and Tracey
Maclin, The Central Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 197, 199-202,
247-48 (1993) (critiquing the limited sphere of influence the Supreme Court has given the
Warrant Clause).
Professor Maclin has asserted that advocates for the warrant preference rule have never
claimed that originalism supports their position. Tracey Maclin, When the Cure for the Fourth
Amendment Is Worse Than the Disease, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 8 (1994) (“Proponents of the
warrant preference rule have never claimed that eighteenth- and nineteenth-century
authorities share their view about the phraseology of the Fourth Amendment.”); see also id.
at 25 (“The warrant preference rule is a twentieth-century construction of the Fourth
Amendment ....”). To the contrary, however, some scholars have at a minimum strongly
implied that a warrant preference rule is consistent with original intent. See, e.g., Davies,
Original Fourth Amendment, supra note 10, at 649-50; Schulhofer, supra note 43, at 115;
Geoffrey G. Hemphill, Note, The Administrative Search Doctrine: Isn’t This Exactly What the
Framers Were Trying To Avoid?, 5 REGENT U. L. REV. 215, 233 (1995).
59. For a brief overview of the conflicting Supreme Court guidance concerning whether
a reasonableness or warrant clause preference rule applies in Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, see Arcila, In the Trenches, supra note 11, at 6-7 & n.16.
60. See id. at 7 & n.19.
61. See id. at 7 & n.18 (explaining that “[s]ince the mid-1980s the Supreme Court has
judged the constitutionality of all civil searches under the ‘special needs’ principle”). Recently,
the Supreme Court adjudged the constitutionality of a civil search under a general
reasonableness test, rather than the special needs principle. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No.
1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2641-42 (2009) (holding unconstitutional a juvenile strip search
in a high school setting). The difference is of little import because both approaches result in
a balancing test. See Arcila, Special Needs, supra note 16, at 1228.
least in terms of Supreme Court jurisprudence.58 Though there
remains a considerable amount of conflicting Supreme Court
guidance,59 the Court seems to have resolved that the constitutional-
ity of criminal searches generally is judged under the Warrant
Clause.60 Though the Court does not appear to have said so
explicitly, it effectively has resolved that civil searches are judged
solely by reference to the Reasonableness Clause.61
In reaching this resolution, the Court is only half right. It is
correct that the Reasonableness Clause governs the constitut-
ionality of all civil searches. But it is wrong in continuing to assert
that the Warrant Clause generally provides the measure of a
criminal search’s constitutionality. Rather, as stated above, the
Reasonableness Clause governs the constitutionality of both
criminal and civil searches. It is surprising how easily this proposi-
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62. Tracey Maclin, The Complexity of the Fourth Amendment: A Historical Review, 77 B.U.
L. REV. 925, 961-65 (1997) [hereinafter Maclin, Fourth Amendment Complexity] (contending
that Fourth Amendment history demonstrates that Framers intended to create presumptive
suspicion requirement).
63. By “constitutional common law,” I mean those aspects of common law that addressed
search or seizure and that the Framers meant to incorporate into the Fourth Amendment.
Identifying those precise aspects is not only difficult, but likely impossible. Yet it seems
certain that the Framers, who drafted and enacted the Bill of Rights in the common law’s
looming shadow, did intend such incorporations. See Arcila, Fourth Amendment Chutzpah,
supra note 13, at 1251-53 (discussing incorporation concept, and difficulty in identifying com-
mon law aspects that were incorporated); see also Amar, Fourth Amendment, supra note 9,
at 758 (asserting that Fourth Amendment sounds in “constitutional tort law”); Anthony J.
Bellia Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Federal Common Law of Nations, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1,
58 & n.304 (2009) (“The Court has read the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable
searches and seizures ... to incorporate common law rights it meant to protect.”).
The phrase also has been used famously in a different sense. See Henry P. Monaghan, The
Supreme Court, 1974 Term—Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 3
(1975) (providing examples of “constitutional common law” that, though having their origins
in the Constitution, are “subject to amendment, modification, or even reversal by Congress”).
64. See BARBARA J. SHAPIRO, “BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT” AND “PROBABLE CAUSE”:
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW OF EVIDENCE 145-47 (1991); Jack
K. Weber, The Birth of Probable Cause, 11 ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 155, 159-66 (1982).
65. See Arcila, Special Needs, supra note 16, at 1236-37.
66. See supra note 30; infra note 92.
tion can be substantiated despite the prominence our Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence has given to the Warrant Clause.
It is certainly possible for the Fourth Amendment to have
imposed a presumptive suspicion requirement through some
mechanism other than its text, such as incorporation of historical
practice, and indeed this argument has been made.62 The next
section addresses why such arguments are incorrect.
B. Originalism
A plausible case for a presumptive suspicion rule can be premised
upon constitutional common law63 and the history of searches that
preceded, and served as an impetus for, the Fourth Amendment.
This argument points to suspicion’s long and undeniable role
under the common law as a validating mechanism for searches.64
Moreover, in adopting the Fourth Amendment, the Framers were
responding to loyalist authorities’ attempts to exercise essentially
unconstrained search power.65 In response, after independence the
Framers generally conditioned statutory searches upon suspicion.66
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67. E.g., Act of Mar. 3, 1815, ch. 94, § 1, 3 Stat. 231, 231-32; Act of Feb. 18, 1793, ch. 8,
§ 27, 1 Stat. 305, 315; Act of Aug. 4, 1790, ch. 35, § 31, 1 Stat. 145, 164; see United States v.
Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 584-85, 592 (1983) (discussing § 31 of the Act of August
4, 1790, the Court wrote “the First Congress clearly authorized the suspicionless boarding of
vessels, reflecting its view that such boardings are not contrary to the Fourth Amendment”).
68. See infra note 92.
This history has contributed towards suspicion’s dominant role in
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Yet, it is crucial to recognize that
suspicion has come to play this role for instrumental reasons. It
worked well in the Framers’ simpler world, which explains why they
often required it, even for regulatory searches. Thus, it was at the
core of their conception of the Fourth Amendment, and consequently
it has formed the core of our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
But we have overstated suspicion’s role in constitutional search
and seizure jurisprudence because we have not recognized that the
Framers merely viewed suspicion instrumentally. The Framers did
not intend suspicion to be either an absolute or presumptive
prerequisite to all valid searches.
The evidence against any originalist presumptive suspicion
requirement is abundant. It turns in part upon the statutory choices
that the Framers made when they authorized suspicionless searches
in the maritime customs context, as well as suspicionless searches
of buildings and even homes for regulatory purposes. Additional
evidence also can be found in the numerous ways in which suspicion
served as perhaps an illusory protection during the Framers’ era,
sometimes due to the immaturity of the concept during that period,
at other times due to the Framers’ active statutory intervention in
limiting access to search remedies, and also because evidence
indicates that the common law validated even suspicionless
searches so long as the search turned out to be successful.
1. Suspicionless Maritime Customs Searches
Immediately upon the nation’s founding, the Framers statutorily
authorized suspicionless customs searches of maritime vessels.67
The Framers’ omission of a suspicion requirement for these mari-
time searches contrasts starkly with the suspicion-based statutory
searches the Framers generally authorized on land.68 The implica-
tion is unavoidable: the Framers knew how to statutorily require
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69. I refer to the “house as castle” principle as “mythic” because, though the sentiment
undoubtedly did come to dominate both English and colonial thought about governmental
search powers, its origins were overstated.
The principle has ancient roots. See LASSON, supra note 11, at 18, 34 n.78. However, for
purposes of the development of search and seizure law in England and the colonies, its origins
are attributed to Semayne’s Case, (1603) 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195 (K.B.). William Cuddihy, From
General to Specific Warrants: The Origins of the Fourth Amendment, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS:
A LIVELY HERITAGE 85, 89 (Jon Kukla ed., 1987). Semayne’s Case provided that “the house of
every one is to him as his castle and fortress, as well for his defence against injury and
violence, as for his repose.” 77 Eng. Rep. at 195 (citation omitted).
During Parliamentary debate on the legality of general warrants, William Pitt exemplified
the popular view that Semayne’s Case recognized a broad protection against searches of
private homes when he argued that:
It is ... a maxim of our law, that every Englishman’s house is his castle. Not that
it is surrounded with walls and battlements. It may be a strawbuilt shed. Every
wind of heaven may whistle round it. All the elements of nature may enter in.
But the king cannot; the king dare not.
WILLIAM GODWIN, THE HISTORY OF THE LIFE OF WILLIAM PITT, EARL OF CHATHAM 153 (2d ed.
London, C. Kearsley, 1783). Some discrepancy exists regarding the date of Pitt’s speech, what
prompted it (common possibilities include cider taxes, excise taxes, or general warrants),
whether it is properly attributed to him, as well as to the speech’s actual content, with
another commonly reported version being:
The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the forces of the Crown.
It may be frail—its roof may shake—the wind may blow through it—the storm
may enter—the rain may enter—but the King of England cannot enter!—all his
force dares not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement!
THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 373-74 (3d ed. 1979) (attributing quote to Lord
Brougham). See generally WILLIAM J. CUDDIHY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ORIGINS AND
ORIGINAL MEANING 602-1791, at 465-66 & n.145 (2009).
In any case, the popular reading was prevalent in the colonies, as exemplified by James
Otis’s repeated use of it in his famous legal argument against writs of assistance in The Writs
Of Assistance Case. See James Otis, Argument on Writs of Assistance (1761), in 2 LEGAL
PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 125 (L. Kinvin Wroth & Hiller B. Zobel eds., 1965) [hereinafter LPJA]
(“This Writ is against the fundamental Principles of Law. The Priviledge of House. A Man,
who is quiet, is as secure in his House, as a Prince in his Castle, not with standing all his
Debts, and civil Prossesses of any kind.”); id. at 142 (“Now one of the most essential branches
of English liberty, is the freedom of one’s house. A man’s house is his castle; and while he is
quiet, he is as well guarded as a prince in his castle. This writ, if it should be declared legal,
would totally annihilate this privilege.” (from John Adams’s abstract of Otis’s argument)); see
also JOSIAH QUINCY, JR., REPORTS OF CASES ARGUED AND ADJUDGED IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
OF JUDICATURE OF THE PROVINCE OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY BETWEEN 1761-1772, at 471 (1865);
M.H. SMITH, THE WRITS OF ASSISTANCE CASE 553-54 (1978). Though there is some dispute on
the matter, solid reasons exist to believe that Otis’s argument had a significant influence on
prior suspicion, but consciously chose not to impose such a require-
ment for maritime customs searches. This is powerful evidence
against a Fourth Amendment presumptive suspicion requirement.
The Framers’ choice is important because, in their time, claims
had been made for extending the mythic “house as castle” principle69
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colonial thought. Arcila, Fourth Amendment Chutzpah, supra note 13, at 1243-44 & nn.46-47.
The popular reading of Semayne’s Case is too broad because the opinion repeatedly took
pains to preserve governmental authority to search private homes in cases in which the king
was involved. 77 Eng. Rep. at 195-98. Thus, a more accurate recitation of the case is that “a
man’s house was his castle only against intrusions by his fellow subjects, not by the Crown.
When the public welfare was at stake, the king’s key legally opened all doors.” Cuddihy,
supra, at 89; accord Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 931 (1995); Payton v. New York, 445
U.S. 573, 604-05 (1980); William J. Cuddihy, Fourth Amendment (Historical Origins), in
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 761, 762 (Leonard W. Levy et al. eds., 1986);
Horace L. Wilgus, Arrest Without a Warrant, 22 MICH. L. REV. 798, 800-01 (1924).
70. S.C. GAZETTE, Nov. 2-9, 1734, at 2.
71. ALEXANDRIA DAILY ADVERTISER, July 15, 1807, at 3.
72. DAILY NAT’L INTELLIGENCER, Apr. 8, 1818, at 2 (second emphasis added); accord
NATIVE AM. Apr. 28, 1813, at 1 (same essay).
73. See WILLIAM S. MCCLELLAN, SMUGGLING IN THE AMERICAN COLONIES AT THE
OUTBREAK OF THE REVOLUTION 58-59, 82-83 (1912); OBSERVATIONS ON SEVERAL ACTS OF
PARLIAMENT 15-18 (Boston, Edes & Gill 1769); NEIL R. STOUT, THE ROYAL NAVY IN AMERICA,
1760-1775, at 25-38, 130 (1973); Resolves by the Massachusetts House of Representatives of
July 1, 1769, BOSTON EVENING POST, July 3, 1769, at 1 (Supplement); Governor Francis
Bernard, Massachusetts Proclamation of Nov. 16, 1763, BOSTON GAZETTE, Nov. 21, 1763, at
to ships. Throughout the eighteenth century, a popular conscious-
ness was growing both in England and the colonies that some
meaningful scope of protection should exist against governmental
searches. Part of this movement argued for extending search
protections even to ships. In 1734, a South Carolinian contended
that “my house is my castle, and so is my ship.”70 This claim was
reiterated in the new nation, when in 1807 a Virginia committee
advocated for adoption of the principle: “let every man’s ship be his
castle, and as free from search as his house.”71 A few years later, an
apparently popular essay (given that it was published on at least
two different occasions) declared, in the context of protesting
impressment, that:
Were a press-gang to steal the son of a leader of opposition from
his house, the nation would be in a ferment—Why? Because his
house is his castle, and its sanctity has been violated. Wherever
a man has his lawful home, there is his castle. Is not a ship, in
which a seaman dwells, as much his castle as Quincy’s, or
Randolph’s, or Pickering’s, dwelling?72
Increased attention to ship searches occurred in part because of
growing colonial hostility to Royal Navy involvement in customs
searches.73 Cuddihy reports that even such lower ranks as “midship
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2.
74. CUDDIHY, supra note 69, at 586.
75. Journal of the Times, BOSTON EVENING POST, June 26, 1769, at 1.
76. Rules by Which a Great Empire May Be Reduced to a Small One, DUNLAP’S PA. PACKET
OR, THE GENERAL ADVERTISER, Aug. 8, 1774, at 1 (Postscript).
The Royal Navy’s involvement was controversial not only because its officers would act as
customs agents, but also because it would sometimes engage in impressment. See W.T.
BAXTER, THE HOUSE OF HANCOCK: BUSINESS IN BOSTON 1724-1775, at 263-64 (1945); THOMAS
HUTCHINSON, THE HISTORY OF THE PROVINCE OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY 231 (1828);
OBSERVATIONS ON SEVERAL ACTS OF PARLIAMENT, supra note 73, at 16.
77. 4 Geo. 3, ch. 15 (1764) (Eng.).
78. OXENBRIDGE THACHER, THE SENTIMENTS OF A BRITISH AMERICAN 10 (Boston, Edes &
Gill 1764).
79. See id. at 10-11.
80. HERBERT S. ALLAN, JOHN HANCOCK: PATRIOT IN PURPLE 102-03 (1948); BAXTER, supra
note 76, at 260-61; OLIVER M. DICKERSON, THE NAVIGATION ACTS & THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 234 (1951).
81. I recognize that this point is debatable given another incident that also involved
Hancock and the Lydia. A day after the original incident, Hancock found either one or both
of the tide waiters engaged in a nighttime search of the ship. Hancock demanded his or their
documentary search authority. The tide waiter(s) had no writ of assistance, and their
credentials (commission and orders) were undated and thus deficient. Hancock then caused
the tide waiter(s) to be forcibly expelled from below decks. ALLAN, supra note 80, at 102-03;
BAXTER, supra note 76, at 261; DICKERSON, supra note 80, at 234. However, at that point,
Hancock remained willing to allow the tide waiter(s) to search “every part of the vessel except
the hold.” ALLAN, supra note 80, at 103; accord BAXTER, supra note 76, at 261; DICKERSON,
supra note 80, at 234-35. Hancock’s willingness to continue to allow the tide waiter(s) to
search above decks undercuts my claim that some viewed ships as enjoying protections
comparable to a castle. This is particularly so because a nighttime search was at issue. At the
time, writs purported to authorize nighttime vessel searches, LASSON, supra note 11, at 54
n.17, though nighttime searches of houses (that is, castles) clearly were disfavored, see id. at
54 (writs permitted only daytime searches on land); BURN’S JUSTICE OF THE PEACE
ABRIDGMENT 1773, supra note 15, at 323; 2 HALE 1736, supra note 10, at 150. Moreover,
Hancock later was declared within his rights in expelling the tide waiter(s) because they
men[ ] and ordinary gunners eventually received commissions with
general powers of search and seizure.”74 Colonists condemned them
as “the most ignorant hair-brain’d ... persons”75 and as “pimping tide
waiters.”76 A call for greater protections was made on the ground
that an English customs law applicable in the colonies, the 1764
Sugar Act,77 “impower[ed] commanders of the king’s ships, to
seize”;78 allowed invasive searches; was too complicated; and left
colonists without any effective means of redress from its oppressive
application.79 In 1768, John Hancock prevented tide waiters from
searching his ship the Lydia below deck during a daytime search.80
Hancock’s actions arguably endorsed the assertion that a ship
enjoyed protections similar to a castle.81
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lacked authority to search. Opinion of Attorney General Jonathan Sewall in the Case of the
Lydia, Given to the Commissioners of Customs at Boston, April 23, 1768, in Oliver M.
Dickerson, Opinion of Attorney General Jonathan Sewall of Massachusetts in the Case of the
Lydia, 4 WM. & MARY Q. 499, 501-04 (Oct. 1947). This further supports that he merely was
exercising existing rights, rather than manifesting a revolutionary intent with Fourth
Amendment implications.
82. E.g., Letter from Sir Francis Bernard, Governor of Massachusetts, to Lord Barrington
(Mar. 4, 1768), in THE BARRINGTON-BERNARD CORRESPONDENCE & ILLUSTRATIVE MATTER
1760-1770, at 147, 148 (Edward Channing & Archibald Cary Coolidge eds., 1912) (indicating
that protest was against trading laws and impost duties).
83. CUDDIHY, supra note 69, at 591.
84. See WILLIAM PULTENEY, THE BUDGET OPENED 26 (1733) (describing ships as “floating
Castles,” but distinguishing them from houses and admitting that ships are readily subject
to inspection while houses should not be); accord 10 CRAFTSMAN 301 (1732-33) (same passage).
Note that Cuddihy cites these sources in support of the proposition that “by the eighteenth
century, many believed that the reasonable expectation of privacy extended beyond houses
to ships,” CUDDIHY, supra note 69, at 413 & n.28, but the sources actually support the
opposite proposition.
85. EDMUND S. MORGAN & HELEN M. MORGAN, THE STAMP ACT CRISIS: PROLOGUE TO
REVOLUTION 65 (rev. ed. 1962); CARL UBBELOHDE, THE VICE-ADMIRALTY COURTS AND THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 67-69 (1960); see also 10 LAWRENCE H. GIPSON, THE BRITISH EMPIRE
BEFORE THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: THE TRIUMPHANT EMPIRE: THUNDER-CLOUDS GATHER IN
THE WEST, 1763-1766, at 243-44 (1961).
86. See Arcila, In the Trenches, supra note 11, at 12 n.36. After its seizure, Hancock’s
Liberty was condemned and “pressed into the revenue service.” STOUT, supra note 73, at 129;
see also ALLAN, supra note 80, at 109; BAXTER, supra note 76, at 268.
Other merchants publicly boasted that they would disallow their
ships from being searched.82 Cuddihy has concluded that during the
1771-1776 period, “Americans increasingly regarded not only houses
but ships as castles.”83 The evidence discussed above supports this
view, and even provides justification for extending it into the 1800s.
Though some contrary evidence exists,84 this implies that, around
the time of the nation’s founding, ships were widely considered
deserving of search and seizure protection, possibly even in a
constitutional sense.
The Framers’ omission of a suspicion requirement for maritime
customs searches is conspicuous because they were well aware of
the ardent public hostility to those searches. Colonial history is
overrun with incidents involving resistance to shipboard customs
searches and seizures. In 1765, a mob rushed aboard the sloop Polly,
which customs officers had seized for undeclared molasses, and
stripped her.85 A famous colonial challenge to customs enforcement
involved the 1768 seizure of John Hancock’s ship Liberty, which
resulted in a riot.86 Later, Hancock participated in a Boston town
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87. See Arcila, In the Trenches, supra note 11, at 12 n.36.
88. LASSON, supra note 11, at 68.
89. CUDDIHY, supra note 69, at 510-11, 514, 520.
90. See, e.g., 3 THOMAS HUTCHINSON, THE HISTORY OF THE COLONY AND PROVINCE OF
MASSACHUSETTS-BAY 136 (Lawrence S. Mayo ed., 1936); MCCLELLAN, supra note 73, at 87-88;
STOUT, supra note 73, at 130, 140-41.
91. CUDDIHY, supra note 69, at 501.
92. Numerous early civil search statutes imposed a suspicion requirement for land
searches. E.g., Act of Mar. 3, 1815, ch. 100, § 10, 3 Stat. 239, 241; Act of Mar. 3, 1815, ch. 94,
§ 2, 3 Stat. 231, 232; Act of Feb. 4, 1815, ch. 31, §§ 2, 4, 3 Stat. 195, 195-97; Act of Mar. 2,
1799, ch. 22, § 68, 1 Stat. 627, 677-78; Act of Aug. 4, 1790, ch. 35, § 48, 1 Stat. 145, 170; Act
of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, § 24, 1 Stat. 29, 43. In a few instances the Framers authorized
suspicionless searches on land. See infra Part II.B.2.
93. Some scholars argue that these matters are not relevant to the Fourth Amendment.
See infra note 97.
meeting that issued a declaration that the seizure had been
improper.87 Lasson reports that “[a]t Newbury, a seizure of molasses
was rescued by a half dozen well-manned boats which went after the
officer, took the goods from him and the boat he was in, and left him
to stay all night on the beach,” as well as that “[a]fter a seizure
under a writ of assistance at Falmouth (now Portland) the assis-
tance rendered by the people of the town consisted in the forcible
recapture of the goods.”88 Cuddihy recounts numerous other in-
stances of resistance to ship-related searches and seizures,89 and
many others exist in the historical record as well.90 The public
resistance to these customs searches was so profound that even
“energetic” customs officers “rarely attempted a seizure, afloat or
ashore, for the mob speedily ‘liberated’ whatever had been confis-
cated.”91 Despite the public hostility to these governmental searches,
the Framers failed to require suspicion for ship-related customs
searches. This choice certainly appears purposeful, given the
Framers’ ubiquitous inclusion of a prior suspicion requirement in
statutes authorizing customs searches on land.92
The Fourth Amendment implications of this choice are subject to
debate. So long as one believes that the Framers’ views about civil
searches in general, and maritime searches in particular, inform
the Fourth Amendment and its scope,93 the implication is that the
Fourth Amendment was not meant to impose a universal pre-
sumptive suspicion requirement. This is likely the correct view.
The Framers’ choices in their customs legislation are usually
viewed as representative of their intent regarding the scope of
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94. See, e.g., Amar, Fourth Amendment, supra note 9, at 766-67; Akhil Reed Amar, Terry
and Fourth Amendment First Principles, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1097, 1104-05 (1998); Amar,
Writs of Assistance, supra note 16, at 59; Maclin, Fourth Amendment Complexity, supra note
62, at 951-54; Sklansky, supra note 35, at 1806-07.
95. The Fourth Amendment was not deemed applicable to the states until the mid-1900s.
Arcila, In the Trenches, supra note 11, at 51 & n.189.
96. See Bookspan, supra note 4, at 507 n.178; Thomas, supra note 10, at 1459 n.36 (“When
the Framers thought ‘search and seizure,’ they almost certainly thought ‘customs.’”).
97. This is not the only plausible interpretation, of course. Professor Davies, for one,
disagrees with my conclusion. He argues that the Framers’ choice represents their
understanding that ship and other regulatory searches fell completely outside the Fourth
Amendment’s purview. Davies, Original Fourth Amendment, supra note 10, at 605-08. Other
scholars have made similar arguments. See Arcila, The Framers’ Search Power, supra note
46, at 421 n.273; Thomas, supra note 10, at 1477-78 (arguing that customs and maritime
inspections were “sui generis”). Based upon his view, Davies argues that the Framers’ choices
with regard to customs and maritime searches say nothing about Fourth Amendment
protections. According to Davies, under an originalist perspective, no presumptive suspicion
requirement flows from the Fourth Amendment in the civil search context because the
amendment was simply inapplicable. Even if Davies is correct, an important point is
confirmed: the Framers did not intend to impose a universal presumptive suspicion
requirement upon all governmental searches.
98. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
99. Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 311 (1978).
Fourth Amendment protections.94 There is good reason for this. The
Fourth Amendment was a limit on federal power,95 and during the
Framers’ era the federal search power was primarily exercised to
enforce revenue laws in the customs and maritime contexts.96 Thus,
the Framers’ views about customs and maritime searches most
likely are instructive with regard to the Fourth Amendment.97
2. Suspicionless Building and Home Searches
The presumptive warrant requirement is frequently invoked as
a protection that is particularly applicable to the home,98 as well as
other types of buildings.99 Because the Fourth Amendment demands
that warrants be supported by probable cause, implicit in this
conception about homes and buildings is that the presumptive
suspicion requirement applies as well. From an originalist perspec-
tive, this approach seems justified given that the common law
tradition manifested a special concern for the home. But it is easy
to overstate this common law tradition. Moreover, insufficient
attention has been paid to a striking statutory choice the Framers
made in 1791, just months before the Fourth Amendment became
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100. See supra note 69.
101. See supra note 69.
102. See Davies, Original Fourth Amendment, supra note 10, at 645.
103. This assertion is not without controversy. Evidence exists to support the notion that
the common law recognized a right to search homes incident to arrest. See TAYLOR, supra note
12, at 28-29, 45. Professor Davies, however, takes issue with this assertion, and has contested
the historical evidence upon which Professor Taylor relied. Davies, Original Fourth
Amendment, supra note 10, at 646-47 & nn.276-77; see also United States v. Rabinowitz, 339
U.S. 56, 75-79 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (arguing that historical evidence supporting
search incident to arrest indicates that only search of person was allowed, but not search of
surroundings). Cuddihy takes the middle road, asserting that legal doctrine from the era did
not recognize authority for such searches, but that evidence of actual practice shows it
occurred. CUDDIHY, supra note 69, at 578-79.
104. See infra Part II.B.3.
105. Act of Mar. 3, 1791, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 199.
106. See id.
effective, in which they approved not only warrantless but also
suspicionless searches of private homes and other buildings.
The common law tradition of protecting the home is often traced
to the famous British maxim that “a man’s home is his castle.”100
But, as I explained above, the popular reading of Semayne’s Case,
the British case from which the maxim derives, is much too broad
and fails to acknowledge the very expansive power the ruling
recognized for public intrusions into private homes.101 Additionally,
other factors may have undermined a universal suspicion require-
ment for home searches. The common law presumptively required
a search warrant before a home could be searched for stolen
goods,102 and the Fourth Amendment mandated that probable cause
had to support such warrants. But evidence indicates that the
common law might sometimes have tolerated suspicionless searches
of homes, such as during a search incident to arrest.103 Moreover, as
I explain in greater detail below, a realistic assessment of search
and seizure law in the Framers’ era provides reasons to doubt the
effectiveness of any presumptive suspicion requirement, if one did
exist.104
Neglected in originalist Fourth Amendment analyses is the
dramatic choice the Framers made to allow suspicionless and
warrantless searches of private homes—along with other build-
ings—in Hamilton’s 1791 Excise Act.105 This statutory enactment
sought to raise internal revenue by imposing excise taxes upon
distillers.106 What is important about it, for present purposes, is that
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107. Id. §§ 25-26, 29, 1 Stat. at 205-06.
108. It also distinguished between distillation for personal versus commercial use,
exempting the former from all requirements under the Act. Id. § 36, 1 Stat. at 208 (exemption
for operation of one still having a capacity of fifty gallons or less).
109. Id. § 25, 1 Stat. at 205.
110. Id. §§ 25-26, 29, 1 Stat. at 205-06. Distillery operations that had failed to register were
subject to warrant-based searches. Id. § 32, 1 Stat. at 207. The standard for obtaining a
warrant was “reasonable cause of suspicion.” Id. Though this differs in syntax from the
Fourth Amendment “probable cause” standard for obtaining a warrant, it appears that these
two phrasings were considered to have the same substantive meaning. Arcila, The Framers’
Search Power, supra note 46, at 396 n.162.
111. John Neville, An Address to the Citizens of Westmoreland, Fayette, and Alleghany
Counties on the Revenue Law, 3 GAZETTE OF THE UNITED STATES 284 (Dec. 31, 1791).
112. The defender was John Neville. See supra note 111. Neville was an Excise Act
enforcement officer during the infamous Whiskey Rebellion several years later, in which he
killed a man who was among a mob that had surrounded his house. The next day, rioters
burned down his house, barn, and other buildings on his property. Neville escaped uninjured.
H.M. BRACKENRIDGE, HISTORY OF THE WESTERN INSURRECTION IN WESTERN PENNSYLVANIA,
distillers could operate at least partially, if not wholly, out of their
homes, a reality that some prior scholarship has not sufficiently
recognized. The Excise Act’s text acknowledges that private homes
could be used for distillery operations, as it repeatedly refers to the
possibility that they might be in a “house” as opposed to some other
kind of commercial premise.107 The Act had to include search pro-
visions to assure it could be adequately enforced, and to that end
distinguished between registered and unregistered distillers.108
The Act required distillers to register with local authorities.109
Remarkably, registered distillers were subject to suspicionless (and
warrantless) searches110—even though the Act’s very text recog-
nized that distillery operations could be located in private homes.
Nothing in the Act, or any other source of law, exempted registered
distillery operations located in private homes from such suspi-
cionless searches.
Admittedly, what power this Excise Act has to undermine the
presumptive suspicion rule is debatable. One could argue that the
Act’s provision for suspicionless searches of private homes is of
secondary importance, perhaps on the basis that distillery opera-
tions were rarely located in private homes. One defender of the Act,
for instance, asserted that “distilleries in most cases form no part
of the dwellings of their owners, any more than a saw mill or a
smith shop.”111 This defender, however, was hardly a disinterested
observer, as he was an Excise Act enforcement officer.112 Further
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COMMONLY CALLED THE WHISKEY INSURRECTION 40-49 (photo. reprint 1969) (1859); THOMAS
P. SLAUGHTER, THE WHISKEY REBELLION: FRONTIER EPILOGUE TO THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
177-80 (1986).
113. I have not had the opportunity to meaningfully research this issue, but what
information I have uncovered indicates that distillery operations were conducted in homes,
though whether in an amount subject to regulation by Hamilton’s 1791 Excise Act is unclear.
See WILLIAM HOGELAND, THE WHISKEY REBELLION: GEORGE WASHINGTON, ALEXANDER
HAMILTON, AND THE FRONTIER REBELS WHO CHALLENGED AMERICA’SNEWFOUND SOVEREIGNTY
66 (2006) (“Americans drank alcoholic beverages in huge quantities. Distilling went on in
home stillhouses, at community stills, and in large-scale commercial operations.”); id. at 67
(observing that “small distillers ... made up the majority that would pay” Hamilton’s excise
tax); SLAUGHTER, supra note 112, at 168 (concluding that “[i]t was the small farmers,
sometimes tenants who owned little more than a dilapidated still, and artisans and laborers
who owned nothing at all, who violently resisted the excise,” which suggests that small home
distilleries existed that were subject to the excise); supra note 108. I have also lacked the
opportunity to adequately research the extent to which the Act was enforced, which might
shed some light on the home search issue. What evidence I have uncovered suggests that the
Act was not effectively enforced. SLAUGHTER, supra note 112, at 166-69 & nn.25 & 29. This
suggests that home searches under the Act likely did not occur. This, however, does not
detract from my argument, which is a textual one, emphasizing that the Framers were willing
to subject homes to suspicionless searches, according to the Excise Act’s text.
114. CUDDIHY, supra note 69, at 745.
evidence regarding the extent to which distillery operations, even if
just a storage area, were located in private homes would be helpful
in analyzing this issue.113
Cuddihy, for one, perceives the Act’s provision for suspicionless
home searches to be of minor importance, though his position is
disputable. He argues that:
Congress and Hamilton designed [the] searches [under the 1791
Excise Act] as a minor exception to the general rule that only
specific search warrants afforded entrance to structures on land
under normal circumstances. The goal of Hamilton’s excise
searches was not to legitimate warrantless searches of houses
but to indicate that distilleries did not constitute dwelling
houses or afford the same degree of privacy.114
In support of this assertion, he correctly points out that:
only apartments where spirits were manufactured or stored
were subject to inspection, not the entire building containing
them .... Moreover, those who registered could specify the area
to be searched as narrowly or spaciously as they wished: ... a
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115. Id. at 744-45 & nn.281 & 283 (citing to sections 25, 26, and 29 of Hamilton’s 1791
Excise Act).
116. Id. at 743; see also id. at 743-44 & nn.276-77.
117. Report of Rep. Josiah Parker’s Comments on Jan. 5, 1791 Regarding Hamilton’s 1791
Excise Act, GAZETTE OF THE U.S., Jan. 8, 1791, at 697, 698. At another point of the debate,
Representative Steel objected that, under the bill, “citizens are subjected to the most
unreasonable, unusual and disgustful situation of having their houses searched at any hour
of the day or night.” Congress. House of Representatives, Friday June 18, THE DAILY
ADVERTISER, June 22, 1790, at 1.
118. On the Excise Law, NAT’L GAZETTE, Feb. 2, 1793, at 109.
lone apartment in a house, or even a single vault in an individ-
ual room.115
One problem with Cuddihy’s interpretation is that it is not clear
how meaningfully protective of privacy the Excise Act’s provisions
were in narrowing the scope of searches. I am unaware of any
evidence indicating how often a home—in whole or in part—was
registered under the Act. But the Act’s text acknowledges this
possibility, and in such instances, and even if only a portion were
registered, it seems plausible that many times an excise officer
would have to pass through private parts of a house to reach the
registered portion. In these instances, an entire family, including
wife and children, would have been forced to tolerate the indignity
of the excise officer’s examination, however cursory, of themselves
and the home’s interior on the way to the registered portion of the
premise.
Another problem is that Hamilton’s 1791 Excise Act was widely
perceived as overly intrusive of privacy. Cuddihy correctly reports
that it “triggered apocalyptic protests.”116 Many of these protests
raised the specter of abusive home searches. During debate,
Representative Josiah Parker warned that the Act “will let loose a
swarm of harpies, who ... will range thro the country, prying into
every man’s house and affairs.”117 An anonymous essay protested
that “[i]t is undeniable, that every citizen’s house in the United
States, is liable to undergo the insult of a search,” and complained
that “a constable ... may easily be had to accompany [the excise
officer] in his search; who will perhaps have” stipulated “to come in
for snacks with him.”118 Several southwestern Pennsylvania
counties issued a resolution declaring that “[i]t is insulting to the
feelings of the people to have their ... houses painted and ran-
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119. Resolves of Southwestern Pennsylvania Delegates of Sept. 7, 1791 Regarding
Hamilton’s 1791 Excise Act, INDEP. GAZETTEER, Sept. 24, 1791, at 3. The complaint about
painting likely refers to the Hamilton 1791 Excise Act requirement that registered distillers
mark the words “Distiller of Spirits” on the front of buildings. Act of Mar. 3, 1791, ch. 15, §
25, 1 Stat. 199, 205.
120. See supra notes 107-10 and accompanying text.
121. See ROBERT W. COAKLEY, THE ROLE OF FEDERAL MILITARY FORCES IN DOMESTIC
DISORDERS, 1789-1878, at 43 (1988); HOGELAND, supra note 113, at 7, 190; SLAUGHTER, supra
note 112, at 3, 212; Stephen I. Vladeck, Note, Emergency Power and the Militia Acts, 114 YALE
L.J. 149, 160-61 (2004).
122. Andrew A. Bruce, Arbitrary Searches and Seizures as Applied to Modern Industry, 18
GREEN BAG 273, 280 (1906).
123. Schulhofer, supra note 43, at 115.
sacked.”119 Perhaps these protests were misguided because they
misapprehended the threat to privacy that the Excise Act posed.
Perhaps the frequent invocations of home invasions were largely
rhetorical and divorced from reality. But they are sufficiently
striking that they should give us pause before concluding that the
Excise Act’s suspicionless home search provisions120 were of little
importance. There certainly is reason to believe that these protests
were more than rhetorical. Those southwestern Pennsylvania
counties that protested the Act were the same ones that exploded in
the Whiskey Rebellion a few years later, which was quelled only
when President George Washington declared martial law and
entered the area with over ten thousand troops.121 Thus, reasons
exist for doubting whether Cuddihy’s interpretation is correct.
In any case, the provisions for suspicionless and warrantless
house searches demonstrate the inaccuracy of assertions such as:
“[w]hen manufacturing was carried on almost exclusively within the
home, ... the right to enter without [a] warrant would certainly have
never been conceded.”122 Professors Schulhofer and Thomas have
made similar mistakes. Schulhofer has asserted that “[i]t was
precisely in the area of the Crown’s ‘special needs’ for import
regulation and revenue forfeitures ... that the Framers were most
insistent upon a warrant issued on particularized probable cause.”123
Though not an “import regulation,” Hamilton’s Excise Act was a
revenue statute that dispensed with both suspicion and warrant
requirements for home searches. For his part, Thomas has written
that “[t]he Excise Act of 1791 ... dispensed with warrants for
searches of registered premises that stored liquor, but required
warrants based on ‘reasonable cause of suspicion’ for searches of
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124. George C. Thomas, III, Remapping The Criminal Procedure Universe, 83 VA. L. REV.
1819, 1829 (1997) (reviewing AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE: FIRST PRINCIPLES (1997)) (emphasis added).
125. Cf. CUDDIHY, supra note 69, at 743 (contending that Hamilton’s 1791 Excise Act
“assumed the constitutionality of some kinds of warrantless searches, albeit not of the house-
to-house kind.... [S]pecific warrants remained the only method of entrance into private
homes.”). In support of this assertion, Cuddihy relies upon the 1791 Excise Act’s sections 29
and 32. Id. at 743 n.274. Section 29 provides “[t]hat it shall be lawful for the officers of
inspection ... upon request, to enter into all and every the houses, store-houses, ware-houses,
buildings and places which shall have been” registered as distillery operations. Act of Mar.
3, 1791, ch. 15, § 29, 1 Stat. 199, 206 (emphasis added). Section 32 authorizes inspection of
suspected distillery operations by warrant. Id. § 32, 1 Stat. at 207.
Cuddihy’s interpretation is possible, but likely wrong. The best reading of section 29's
language, with its explicit reference to “houses,” is that it authorized warrantless and
suspicionless searches of registered distillery operations, even if they were located in private
homes. See supra notes 105-10 and accompanying text. Nothing in section 32 undermines this
interpretation. Rather, section 32 provided a mechanism to search nonregistered premises
suspected of running a distillery operation in violation of the Act. See supra note 110.
Cuddihy’s interpretation is correct only if section 29’s reference to entry “upon request” was
meant to provide a bar to entry. If so, then I have misinterpreted section 29 as authorizing
warrantless and suspicionless entry. Rather, it would have allowed entry only upon consent,
forcing officials to seek recourse to a search warrant under section 32 if entry was refused.
I cannot totally discount Cuddihy’s interpretation, but I doubt it is correct. It places too
much reliance on the phrase “upon request” while ignoring the vitriolic scorn directed toward
excise taxes, which included repeated and vociferous protests that enforcement allowed
invasive home searches, a concern that even contributed to insurrection during the Whiskey
Rebellion, which protested this very Excise Act. See supra notes 112, 116-19 and
accompanying text; see also Arcila, The Framers’ Search Power, supra note 46, at 404 n.200.
Given this history and the Excise Act’s structure, section 29’s reference to “upon request” is
better read as akin to “upon notice,” rather than to “upon [a] request [that is granted].”
private residences.”124 To the contrary, the Excise Act allowed
warrantless and even suspicionless searches of private homes that
had registered with local authorities. Under the Act, whether an
edifice was subject to a warrantless, or only warrant-based, search
depended solely upon whether it was a registered premise. It did not
hinge upon whether the edifice was a private home or commercial
premise, in recognition that distillery-related businesses could
operate out of private homes. Cuddihy makes a related error, and is
wrong for the same reason.125
3. Suspicion as an Illusory Protection
A realistic assessment of life under the Fourth Amendment
during the nation’s early history, in relation to factors such as
search warrant procedures and the accessibility of remedies for
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126. Arcila, In the Trenches, supra note 11, at 24-48 (making this argument with regard
to actual search warrant practice). But cf. Davies, Original Fourth Amendment, supra note
10, at 589 & n.103, 654 n.297 (arguing that judicial sentryship of probable cause prior to
issuing search warrants was well established as a matter of legal doctrine).
127. Arcila, In the Trenches, supra note 11, at 24-26 & nn.84-87.
128. Id. at 24-27.
wrongful searches, provides another important reason for doubting
the validity of an originalist presumptive suspicion requirement.
It certainly appears true that suspicion played an important role
in the Framers’ conception of Fourth Amendment protections.
Nonetheless, it also appears true that we have overemphasized the
protections that suspicion afforded. We have failed to acknowledge
the many limitations on suspicion’s role during that same era,
which the Framers either accepted or actually implemented. I will
discuss those limitations in this section. To the extent that I have
set out my position on these matters in detail elsewhere, I will only
summarize them here.
a. Suspicion’s Limited Protective Role
Under both common and statutory law during the Framers’ era,
suspicion played a role in search and seizure law, but in a more
nuanced manner than we have acknowledged. Examples can be
found in the common law procedure for issuing search warrants and
challenging wrongful searches, and in the choices the Framers made
when implementing civil search statutes.
Many judges in the Framers’ era may have believed that judicial
sentryship of probable cause prior to issuing search warrants was
optional, and would have felt justified in not monitoring suspicion
at all prior to issuing such warrants.126 Perhaps the best evidence
of this can be found in leading English treatises, which stated that
judicial sentryship of suspicion was “convenient” but “not always
necessary”—in other words, that it was merely optional.127 American
manuals for justices of the peace—which justices of the peace, who
actually issued search warrants, most likely consulted—often in-
cluded this guidance from English treatises.128 Additionally, legal
forms regularly implied that judicial sentryship of suspicion was
optional. Often, they did not require the applicant for a search
warrant to specify the detailed factual grounds supporting suspi-
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129. Id. at 32-36; Wesley M. Oliver, Portland, Prohibition and Probable Cause: Maine's
Role in Shaping Modern Criminal Procedure, 2008 ME. B. J. 210, 212 & nn.14 & 22-24.
130. Arcila, In the Trenches, supra note 11, at 36-40.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 45-48.
133. Arcila, The Framers’ Search Power, supra note 46, at 376-79.
134. See Amar, Fourth Amendment, supra note 9, at 773 (“Far more trustworthy were
twelve men, good and true, on a local jury, independent of the government, sympathetic to the
cion.129 Moreover, like today, search warrants themselves did not
specify the grounds supporting suspicion.130 But, unlike today, there
was no reliable procedure for preserving a record of the asserted
grounds supporting probable cause.131
Given that the application forms for search warrants often did not
require the specification of underlying facts, there are abundant
reasons for doubting that judges would have had the information
they needed to act as probable cause sentries prior to issuing search
warrants. Admittedly, judges who wished to act as probable cause
gatekeepers could have orally inquired in an effort to obtain the
information they needed. But we can expect that they would have
done so only if they believed this was the proper procedure to follow.
Not only could legal treatises and American justice manuals have
easily negated such a belief, for the reasons already discussed
above, but solid reasons exist to believe that important civil search
statutes from the era either were meant, or were perceived, to
deprive an issuing magistrate of the power to review claims of prior
suspicion.132 Thus, it is far from clear that issuing judges would have
inquired into the grounds of probable cause if, as was often the case,
such information was not initially provided.
Even if ex ante judicial sentryship of probable cause was limited,
this does not fatally undermine suspicion’s protective role during
the Framers’ era, though it should cause us some doubts about
suspicion’s efficacy. Under the common law, an ex post examination
of suspicion was available to an aggrieved claimant through a
trespass action, with a jury assessing whether the requisite level of
suspicion had existed for the search.133 The dynamics of such an ex
post review might be considered superior in that it allowed for an
adversarial presentation about the adequacy of suspicion—as
opposed to the ex ante, ex parte warrant application process—and
made claimant-friendly juries the decision maker, rather than a
single, government-employed judge.134
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legitimate concerns of fellow citizens, too numerous to be corrupted, and whose vigilance could
not easily be evaded by governmental judge-shopping.”); id. at 817 (“Civil litigation after the
fact, with both citizen and government represented in the court-room, would be far more
deliberative and reviewable than the current system of practically unreviewable rubberstamp
magistrates acting ex parte.”). For more about the colonial history of juries being particularly
claimant friendly, see Arcila, The Framers’ Search Power, supra note 46, at 380 & nn.66-67,
398 & n.170, 408 & n.219.
135. Arcila, The Framers’ Search Power, supra note 46, at 392-410.
136. See supra Part II.B.1-2.
Yet ex post review under the common law also suffered from
various deficiencies. The most important was that suspicion would
be assessed only if a claimant took the initiative to litigate the issue.
This required not only a motivated claimant, but also that the
litigation be economically feasible, both in terms of the claimant’s
ability to finance the litigation and potential damages. Thus, there
is reason to believe that litigation would ensue only in a minority of
the instances in which a searched party was aggrieved. When such
litigation happened, the adequacy of suspicion would have been
assessed only once, not twice, if ex ante judicial sentryship had not
occurred. And if no such litigation happened, the adequacy of
suspicion justifying a search may never have been independently
assessed.
Suspicion likely played a more effective protective role in civil
search cases. In the new nation’s civil search statutes, the Framers
departed from the common law model in numerous ways, but for
present purposes one change was particularly significant. In these
statutes, the Framers often chose to make probable cause an
immunity standard.135 By linking immunity to probable cause, the
Framers gave civil searchers a strong incentive to operate from a
threshold level of suspicion before searching. By the same token, in
these same statutes the Framers often authorized suspicionless
searches.136 Thus, while those provisions linking immunity to
probable cause did help engender a focus upon threshold levels of
suspicion, one can question what impact those provisions had in
light of other instances in which suspicion was statutorily shunted
aside.
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137. See Arcila, The Framers’ Search Power, supra note 46, at 396 n.162.
138. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27, 30 (1968).
139. See Arcila, In the Trenches, supra note 11, at 43-44.
140. 2 HALE 1800, supra note 10, at 81; 2 HALE 1736, supra note 10, at 81; 2 HAWKINS 1787,
supra note 11, at 119; accord 2 HAWKINS 1739, supra note 10, at 76.
141. 2 HALE 1800, supra note 10, at 81; 2 HALE 1736, supra note 10, at 81.
142. 2 HAWKINS 1787, supra note 11, at 119; accord 2 HAWKINS 1739, supra note 10, at 76.
143. 2 HAWKINS 1787, supra note 11, at 119; accord 2 HAWKINS 1739, supra note 10, at 76.
144. 2 HAWKINS 1787, supra note 11, at 119; accord 2 HAWKINS 1739, supra note 10, at 76.
145. 2 HALE 1800, supra note 10, at 85; 2 HALE 1736, supra note 10, at 85.
b. Changes in Language
Even if one believes, contrary to the preceding section, that judges
acted as probable cause sentries prior to issuing search warrants,
that procedural protection may often have been illusory given the
meaning attributed to probable cause at the time. In the new
nation, “probable cause” and its variants, such as “reasonable
cause,” did not mean the same thing as they do now. For example,
during the nation’s early history “probable cause” and “reasonable
cause” were given the same meaning.137 In contrast, modern Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence has distinguished between “probable
cause” and “reasonable suspicion” since at least 1968.138 Further,
historical evidence about the meaning attributed to “probable” at
the nation’s founding indicates that, contrary to today, it could have
meant “possible” or even been equated with a mere hunch.139
Moreover, search and seizure law was developing during an era
when influential British treatises instructed that probable cause
could be satisfied through allegations that would never be accepted
today. They indicated that “probable cause” or “sufficient causes of
suspicion” could exist based upon “common fame”;140 merely being
found in “party with him that committed the robbery”141 or even
“keeping company with persons of scandalous reputations”;142 “living
a vagrant, idle and disorderly life, without having any visible means
to support it”;143 or “being charged with a treason or felony” while
“say[ing] nothing to it, but seem[ing] tacitly by his silence to own
himself guilty.”144 Another nugget of legal wisdom was that “just
suspicion” could exist because a person was a “night-walker.”145 In
light of this evidence, abundant linguistic reasons exist for doubting
that probable cause offered a meaningful level of search or seizure
protection.
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146. Arcila, The Framers’ Search Power, supra note 46, at 414-20.
147. Id. at 417-18.
148. Id. at 418-19.
149. Id. at 414-16.
150. Id. at 416.
151. Id. at 417.
152. Id. at 420.
153. Id.
c. Limits on Search Remedies
In the civil search context during this early part of our history,
the Framers strongly and persistently discouraged suits against
governmental officers through the statutory implementation of
numerous procedural obstacles that claimants had to overcome.146
Not all of these procedural obstacles undermined suspicion as a
Fourth Amendment protective mechanism. For example, the
Framers’ statutes sometimes deprived even successful claimants of
costs if the judge made a probable cause certification,147 and in other
instances placed the burden of proof upon the claimant if a judge
determined that probable cause had been present.148 Because these
obstacles were triggered only if probable cause had supported the
search, they were consistent with the notion of using suspicion as a
Fourth Amendment protective concept.
However, in numerous other instances the Framers imposed
procedural obstacles that made it harder to access search remedies,
and when they did so the result was to undermine suspicion’s
protective function. This is because, in these instances, the proce-
dural obstacles applied regardless of suspicion. These procedural
obstacles applied even if the search had been wrongful either due to
a suspicion deficit, that is, some level of suspicion had been present
but not enough to meet the required threshold, or even due to a
complete lack of suspicion. The laundry list of these procedural
obstacles that the Framers favored included: (1) authorizing officers
to plead the general issue;149 (2) authorizing them to plead the
President’s rules in defense, or to submit into evidence the statutory
act and its authorization for civil searches, as well as “any special
matter”;150 (3) granting successful defendants double or even treble
costs;151 (4) authorizing the court to summarily adjudge the case;152
and (5) allowing removal of a case from state court even after
judgment, with the federal court then proceeding de novo.153 It is
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154. See supra text accompanying notes 147-48.
155. Amar, Fourth Amendment, supra note 9, at 767 (“At common law, it seems that
nothing succeeded like success. Even if a constable had no warrant, and only weak or
subjective grounds for believing someone to be a felon or some item to be contraband or stolen
goods, the constable could seize the suspected person or thing. The constable acted at his
peril. If wrong, he could be held liable in a damage action. But if he merely played a hunch
and proved right—if the suspect was a felon, or the goods were stolen or contraband—this ex
post success apparently was a complete defense.”).
156. 2 HALE 1800, supra note 10, at 151 (stating that, “[i]f the door be shut” and not opened
upon request, “the officer may break open the door” without punishment “if the stolen goods
be in the house”); accord 2 HALE 1736, supra note 10, at 151. Hale also made a similar point
in the context of a hue-and-cry search. See infra note 195.
157. Arcila, The Framers’ Search Power, supra note 46, at 373 & n.34.
158. In Leglise v. Champante, which involved a claimant’s challenge to a customs officer’s
seizure of wine, the court stated that “the officer seizes at his peril, and ... a probable cause
is no defense.” (1728) 93 Eng. Rep. 871, 871, 2 Strange 820, 820 (K.B.) (emphasis added). The
court clearly rejected probable cause as an immunity standard. Though debatable, its
reference to “at his peril” suggests that the court agreed that immunity was dependent upon
successfully seizing contraband. See infra note 195 and accompanying text.
I have previously noted that the Leglise probable cause ruling might be incorrect because
the reporter includes a notation identifying an applicable statute that contained a probable
cause safe harbor. Arcila, The Framers’ Search Power, supra note 46, at 374 & n.36.
perhaps telling that the Framers chose to implement these proce-
dural obstacles without reference to suspicion given that they
clearly knew how to safeguard suspicion’s protective role when
implementing such obstacles.154
d. Successful-Search Immunity Defense
Professor Amar has asserted that the common law recognized a
successful-search immunity defense,155 and though this assertion
has been challenged, he appears to be correct. The historical
evidence indicates that under the common law, success immunized
the initial deficiencies in a search, including a lack of a warrant or
even suspicion. The common law did so by providing an immunity
defense to a trespass action when stolen goods or contraband were
found. During the Framers’ era, guidance to this effect was found in
a leading British treatise156 and was ubiquitously reiterated in both
British and American manuals for justices of the peace.157 A leading
British case from 1728 arguably agreed with this guidance.158 The
language that was used in these authorities made it crystal clear
that the successful-search immunity defense applied in common law
contexts (stolen goods) as well as statutory contexts (contraband
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159. See Arcila, The Framers’ Search Power, supra note 46, at 373 n.34 (citing sources that
refer variously to breaking down the doors of a house to search for stolen goods, as well as to
authorizations to enter houses to search for and seize “run goods [i.e., contraband] ... at the
[ ] peril of finding some there”).
160. Arcila, In the Trenches, supra note 11, at 10-12.
161. Id. at 11 n.31 (noting this possibility, and admitting that earlier I had failed to
recognize it).
162. Davies, Original Fourth Amendment, supra note 10, at 647-48 & nn.278-79.
163. Id. at 647.
164. For example, Amar cites several authorities in support of an ex post success defense
in the arrest context, such as Hawkins’s leading English treatise as well as three state court
decisions from the 1800s. Amar, Fourth Amendment, supra note 9, at 767 nn.30 & 33. Davies
agrees with Amar that the common law recognized “an ‘ex post success defense’ to trespass
for felony arrests.” Davies, Original Fourth Amendment, supra note 10, at 647 n.278.
165. Amar, Fourth Amendment, supra note 9, at 767 & n.31.
evading regulatory statutes), and also to houses.159 This would have
seemed a familiar doctrine in the Framers’ era. During colonial
times, colonists had bitter experience with writs of assistance.160
There is reason to believe that this experience would have familiar-
ized them with a successful-search immunity defense because, as
Professor Amar has explained, it appears that writs offered
immunity only if a search had been successful.161
Professor Davies does not believe that the common law recognized
this immunity defense, at least in connection with house searches.162
His conclusion is based upon two factors. First, Davies asserts that
Professor Amar provides no evidence in support of the claim that a
successful-search immunity defense existed. Second, Davies relies
upon five cases to disprove the defense. The best reading of all the
evidence, however, indicates that Davies is mistaken.
Davies writes that “Professor Amar has asserted the existence of
a broad ‘ex post success justification’ for searching for and discover-
ing stolen goods or contraband—but has not identified any support-
ing authority.”163 This is a grudging view, and it depends heavily
upon how Davies limits it to the search context. Specifically, Amar
does provide supporting authority for his ex post success justifica-
tion, but it concerns principally the seizure or arrest contexts.164 He
does cite other authorities in an attempt to support a successful-
search immunity defense, but (as he himself acknowledges) they do
not provide direct support for that proposition. As to searches, he
cites three British decisions,165 all of which were part of the famous
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support for the successful-search immunity defense. See supra notes 155-59.
Amar also cites to a portion of Money v. Leach, but I see no reference to the successful-
search immunity defense, either directly or indirectly, at the pages he cites. Cf. Amar, Fourth
Amendment, supra note 9, at 767 & n.31 (citing Money v. Leach, 97 Eng. Rep. 1075, 1082-83
(K.B. 1765)). He also cites Wilkes v. Wood, but again any reference to the defense seems to be
absent. Cf. Amar, Fourth Amendment, supra note 9, at 767 & n.31 (citing Wilkes v. Wood, 19
How. St. Tri. 1153, 1166 (C.P. 1763), 98 Eng. Rep. 489, 498).
170. See supra notes 155-59 and accompanying text.
171. Davies, Original Fourth Amendment, supra note 10, at 647-48.
172. (1770) 95 Eng. Rep. 934, 3 Wilson 61 (K.B.).
173. Davies, Original Fourth Amendment, supra note 10, at 647-48 & n.279.
174. Id. at 648 n.279.
Wilkes controversy “that inspired the Fourth Amendment.”166 Amar
claims that “[v]ariants of the ex post success defense appeared
prominently in” these three decisions.167 Davies is surprisingly
silent about them. This may be because Amar provides only indirect
support for the successful-search immunity defense. (Amar, after
all, explained that the cases referred to “variants” of the defense.)
So, when Amar cites to one of the published versions of Entick v.
Carrington,168 he is referring to the passage indicating that an
owner of stolen goods would be liable for a search unless the goods
were found169—the flip side of the successful-search immunity
defense.
Regardless, the case in favor of a successful-search immunity
defense does not depend solely upon Amar’s authorities. As
indicated above, voluminous authorities provide abundant support
for it.170
Davies, in asserting “that the success of a search was not
sufficient justification for a violation of a house,”171 relies upon five
cases, but to no avail. Davies relies upon Bruce v. Rawlins,172 which
upheld a trespass verdict against customs officers who had searched
a home under a writ of assistance but without a constable, as the
writ had required.173 According to Davies, “the successful seizure of
uncustomed goods was not enough to justify the house search; the
justification for the house search depended on compliance with the
writ of assistance.”174 The first problem with Davies’s conclusion is
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that the successful-search immunity defense was never at issue
because the search had been unsuccessful. The case report expressly
states that “defendants searched, but found no uncustomed goods,”
and even notes that the officers “departed, cursing and saying,
Damn it, there are no goods! ”175 The second problem is that, as
Davies notes, the search had occurred under authority of a writ of
assistance.176 Amar has identified reasons for believing that such
writs provided immunity only if the search was successful.177 The
search in Bruce was unsuccessful. Thus, it is not directly on point,
and moreover I see nothing in it that provides even implicit evidence
against a successful-search immunity defense.
Davies also is off the mark in relying upon Bell v. Clapp, an 1813
New York case, though he does slightly better with Sandford v.
Nichols, an 1816 Massachusetts case.178 Davies claims support from
these decisions because each involved successful searches yet
neither mentions the successful-search immunity defense.179
With respect to Bell, Davies’s reasoning goes too far because he
is relying upon a nonexistent negative implication. Bell, in which
the court upheld a search because it occurred under a valid
warrant,180 merely validates the common law doctrine that warrants
immunized searchers.181 It is an error in logic to conclude that this
invalidates, by negative implication, the successful-search immunity
defense. When alternate explanations are available, embracing one
does not necessarily invalidate the other. For example, Bell could
have resulted from a tactical lawyering decision to rely upon one
defense but not the other. It is even possible the successful-search
defense was raised but that no reference was made to it in the
reported decision because the case could be resolved on the warrant
ground.
Sandford is admittedly a stronger case for Davies, but it cannot
bear the weight he places upon it because he commits the similar
error of relying too heavily upon a debatable negative implication.
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182. Sandford v. Nichols, 13 Mass. (1 Tyng) 286, 289 (1816).
183. See supra notes 155-61 and accompanying text for a review of the evidence supporting
this defense.
184. Sailly v. Smith, 11 Johns. 500, 502-03 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1814).
185. Davies, Original Fourth Amendment, supra note 10, at 649 n.283 (quoting Sailly, 11
Johns. at 502-03).
The Sandford court held in a trespass case that the warrant should
not have been allowed into evidence to justify the search because it
was defective for a lack of particularity.182 It is certainly unusual
that the trespass verdict’s validity rested upon the admissibility of
a warrant when the successful-search defense could have mooted
that issue. But Sandford’s failure to explicitly address the defense
raises the prospect of confounding factors, so that we should pause
before agreeing with Davies’s conclusion. The decision could, for
instance, have resulted from less-than-stellar lawyering or judging,
which could explain why the defense was not discussed. In other
words, though Davies finds in Sandford’s omission conclusive proof
against the successful-search immunity defense, a sounder approach
is to interpret the omission as, at best, inconclusive. Thus, it is this
very omission that makes Sandford too thin a reed upon which
to reject, as Davies does, the extensive evidence supporting the
successful-search immunity defense.183
Davies also relies upon Sailly v. Smith, an 1814 New York case,
but it, too, fails to support him. Sailly upheld a warrantless but
statutorily-authorized search and seizure of unlawfully imported
goods that were found in an open public horse-shed.184 Davies
emphasizes that:
[t]he court’s opinion noted that the statute also purported to
authorize warrantless searches of dwelling-houses, and com-
mented that authority for a warrantless search of a house would
be “an extensive and highly important authority ... if it does
exist,” and that the “more correct course” for searching a house
would be for the officer to obtain a search warrant.185
Based upon these passages and the discussion of warrants, in
conjunction with the opinion’s failure to invoke the successful-
search immunity defense, Davies concludes that no such defense
existed. Again, Davies reads too much into the decision.
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186. See Sailly, 11 Johns. at 502 (providing title of act, referring to its section eight, and
noting that it was “continued in force, by a supplementary act, passed the second day of
March, 1811”); cf. Act of Mar. 2, 1811, ch. 29, § 3, 2 Stat. 651, 651 (providing that section eight
of March 1809 Non-Intercourse Act “shall have full force and be immediately carried into
effect against Great Britain”); March 1809 Non-Intercourse Act, Act of Mar. 1, 1809, ch. 24,
2 Stat. 528 (showing same title of act as given in Sailly).
187. March 1809 Non-Intercourse Act, § 8, 2 Stat. at 530 (emphasis added); see also Sailly,
11 Johns. at 502 (quoting this language).
188. Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, § 24, 1 Stat. 29, 43.
189. E.g., Act of Mar. 2, 1799, ch. 22, § 68, 1 Stat. 627, 677-78; Act of Aug. 4, 1790, ch. 35,
§ 48, 1 Stat. 145, 170. The only intervening revenue law of which I am aware that did not
follow this pattern was Hamilton’s 1791 Excise Act, which had allowed warrantless searches
of homes if they had been registered under the Act. See supra notes 105-25 and accompanying
text. But it imposed excise taxes, not customs duties, and thus appears to have been
inapplicable under the terms of the March 1809 Non-Intercourse Act, which referred to
“goods ... subject to duty.” See supra text accompanying note 187 (emphasis added).
Though the court did not provide an explicit citation to the
relevant statute, it was referring to the March 1809 Non-Intercourse
Act.186 There lies the first problem because it appears that the Sailly
court was incorrect in claiming that the March 1809 Non-Inter-
course Act authorized warrantless home searches. This issue is
challenging to pin down because the Act indirectly granted search
authority by reference to other unspecified statutes, stating that
customs officers “shall have the like power and authority ... to enter
any ship or vessel, dwelling-house, store, building or other place, for
the purpose of searching for and seizing any such goods ... which ...
they now have by law in relation to goods ... subject to duty.”187 The
problem with the Sailly court’s interpretation is that customs law,
which imposed duties and established enforcement regimes, had
long required warrants for land-based searches in general and house
searches in particular. This had been the case in the nation’s first
customs law, the 1789 Collection Act,188 and as far as I am aware
the pattern had been followed in all customs laws up to the March
1809 Non-Intercourse Act.189
In any case, let us return to what lessons, if any, Sailly provides
with regard to the existence of a successful-search immunity
defense. After apparently misinterpreting the March 1809 Non-
Intercourse Act as authorizing warrantless home searches, the
Sailly court refused to resolve whether the Act lawfully did so,
stating that “it is not necessary to decide whether the collector, by
law, is, at all times, authorized to enter and search a dwelling
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193. 38 Mass. (21 Pick.) 156 (1838).
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house, without first obtaining a warrant from a magistrate.”190 In
conformity with the common law tradition, the court concededly
iterated a preference for warrant-based home searches. But the
court certainly was not insisting upon a validating warrant. It
noted, “yet, public convenience, in many instances, may require that
it [i.e., the power to conduct warrantless home searches] should be
exercised.”191 Emphasizing that the search at issue had been of a
“sleigh standing under an open [horse] shed”—leaving unspoken
how unfavorably it compared to a house in terms of Fourth Amend-
ment protections—the court upheld the search and seizure on the
basis that “the law of the United States [that is, the March 1809
Non-Intercourse Act] authorized it, and is a sufficient protection to
the defendant in this cause.”192 Of course, since the March 1809
Non-Intercourse Act simply propagated prior existing statutory
search authority, which had required warrants for land-based
searches, this Sailly court ruling also appears to have been incor-
rect.
Regardless, it goes too far to argue that the Sailly court’s
expressed preference for warrants equates with a rejection of the
successful-search immunity defense. Any argument that the court
cast doubt upon the defense by failing to rely upon it is unavailing
for the same reason that such a negative implication from Bell is a
logical error: adoption of one available alternative rationale (the
statutory authorization for the warrantless search) does not
invalidate the other available alternative that was not invoked (the
successful-search immunity defense).
The last case Davies relies upon, Banks v. Farwell,193 likewise
does not offer Davies sufficient support. Davies claims that Banks
is consistent with his position that there was no successful-search
immunity defense because “the judges recited that ‘[h]ad [the
constable and the complainant] attempted to break into the plain-
tiff’s house or shop for the purpose of searching for stolen property,
they would have gone aside from their authority and would have
acted at their peril.’”194 There are two problems with Davies’s
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195. See 3 NATHAN DANE, A GENERAL ABRIDGEMENT AND DIGEST OF AMERICAN LAW 521, at
§ 8 (1824) (stating that “[o]fficers enter houses to seize run goods &c., at their peril of finding
some there”(emphasis added)); 2 HALE 1800, supra note 10, at 103 (indicating that a constable
engaged in a hue-and-cry pursuit breaks open doors “at his peril” of finding the suspect inside;
thus, a search is “justifiable, if he be there; not justifiable, if he be not there”); 2 HALE 1736,
supra note 10, at 103 (same); supra note 158 (citing the 1728 British case Leglise v.
Champante and quoting its use of the “peril” formulation); see also HENING, NEW VIRGINIA
JUSTICE 1799, supra note 10, at 40 (explaining that a lay person, who arrests upon mere
suspicion, breaks open doors “at his peril” because breaking is justifiable only if the arrestee
is a felon).
196. Banks, 38 Mass. (21 Pick.) at 159-60.
197. See id.
interpretation. The first problem is that Davies either overin-
terprets or misinterprets the passage. True, the court’s reference to
going “aside from their authority” might support his argument. But
the phrase is too ambiguous to offer Davies sufficient support
because it begs the question of what exactly was the scope of the
officials’ authority. Rather, the key to understanding the passage is
its closing phrase. The court’s choice of the phrase “at their peril”
was quite purposeful because it refers to the risk of not finding
contraband.195 The court meant that, even if the officers had acted
“aside from their authority,” the successful-search immunity defense
would have protected them had they found contraband—they would
have avoided the “peril” of liability to which they would have been
exposed had they found nothing. Thus, Banks and its reference to
“peril” is perfectly consistent with the successful-search immunity
defense. The second problem with Davies’s interpretation is that the
court upheld the successful search and seizure against the trespass
challenge.196 It appears to have done so on the theory that the
search and seizure was a lawful corollary to the duty that the arrest
warrant imposed upon the constable.197 Again, the court’s willing-
ness to rule based on one available ground (the search was a lawful
corollary to the constable’s duty under the arrest warrant) does
not invalidate another available rationale (the successful-search
immunity defense). Consequently, Banks is not solid evidence
against the successful-search immunity defense.
In sum, of the five cases Davies relies upon, only Sandford
provides some slight support for his position. But it is too slender a
reed upon which to perch, particularly in light of the extensive
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202. See supra text accompanying notes 54-57.
203. See supra notes 50-56 and accompanying text.
authorities that support the successful-search immunity defense.198
In the absence of more reliable reasons to question the latter
authorities, they carry the day.
C. Suspicion as Proxy
Due to the analytical incoherence of our Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, suspicion is useful mostly as a proxy, rather than as
a determinant of constitutional reasonableness in and of itself.
Often its value is that it serves as a proxy to other protected Fourth
Amendment values, and as such helps to protect against govern-
mental overreaching.199 Characterizing suspicion as merely a proxy
should be uncontroversial. It is because suspicion is merely a proxy
that it is not necessarily requisite to the Fourth Amendment
constitutionality of a governmental search. Many suspicionless
searches are constitutional under the Fourth Amendment, in both
the criminal200 and civil201 contexts.
The reason why suspicion’s main value is as a proxy is that, as I
explained above, the Reasonableness Clause governs the constitution-
ality of all searches, both criminal and civil.202 It is the relationship
between suspicion and the Reasonableness Clause, and how each
relates to a search’s constitutionality, that is the key to this proper
understanding of the Fourth Amendment. Return to the Fourth
Amendment’s text. Recall that when the Warrant Clause’s text is
considered in light of history, it clearly does not impose a presump-
tive suspicion requirement, and that from both a textual and
functional standpoint the Reasonableness Clause does not either.203
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content of the suspicion failed to match the degree of intrusion.”).
205. See Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 318 (1997) (invalidating suspicionless drug
testing of certain candidates for public office in Georgia because the governmental interest
supporting the search was merely symbolic, which was not sufficiently “substantial”).
206. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
207. Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002).
208. Acton, 515 U.S. at 654-55; see Earls, 536 U.S. at 830-31.
The Reasonableness Clause’s primacy becomes clearer when one
closely considers suspicion’s role in Fourth Amendment juris-
prudence. Even in those instances when a search warrant is
required—and certainly in all instances of warrantless searches—
suspicion is not sufficient, by itself, to assure a search’s constitution-
ality. The Fourth Amendment protects a host of values, and
suspicion protects only some of them. Irrespective of suspicion—and
even in instances when a required suspicion threshold has been
satisfied—a search could be unconstitutional under the Fourth
Amendment for many reasons. It could be that the search was
overly invasive or intrusive.204 It could be that the governmental
interest supporting the search was not sufficiently compelling.205 Or,
it could be that the search target’s privacy interests were so
substantial as to render the search illegitimate. 
Consider, for example, the two cases in which the Supreme Court
has validated suspicionless drug testing of public high school
students, first of student athletes,206 and then of any student
involved in school-related extracurricular activities.207 The Court’s
reasoning in these cases turned crucially upon the in loco parentis
doctrine,208 which leads to a question: Would the outcomes have
been the same if undergraduate college students had been at issue?
How about graduate students? Though all other factors would
remain the same—the governmental interest in combating drug use,
the school interest in assuring student safety, for example—the best
outcome would be to invalidate these searches because the students’
privacy interests would now trump other factors since the in loco
parentis doctrine would no longer subjugate those privacy interests.
These values—invasiveness or intrusiveness, assuring a compelling
governmental need, privacy interests—are only some of the ones
that the Fourth Amendment protects but suspicion does not. Other
Fourth Amendment values that the Court has properly considered
when judging a search’s constitutionality include the immediacy of
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the governmental interest, as well as the search’s efficacy and its
deterrence value.209 Only through Reasonableness Clause primacy
does Fourth Amendment jurisprudence protect all such values.
The Fourth Amendment value that suspicion most directly
protects is limited governmental discretion, which is another value
that the Supreme Court has repeatedly considered.210 No doubt,
suspicion can serve as an extremely useful tool for limiting govern-
mental discretion. But it is no panacea. Suspicion’s effectiveness in
this regard depends upon a host of factors, such as the rigorousness
of the suspicion threshold (for example, probable cause versus
reasonable suspicion), or the deliberateness with which judges carry
out their probable cause sentryship role prior to issuing search
warrants. Moreover, suspicion is far from the only tool available for
limiting governmental discretion, and others may be more useful in
particular circumstances.
Limiting governmental discretion is probably the core Fourth
Amendment value. The next section is devoted to considering means
that are available for protecting this and other Fourth Amendment
values in the absence of suspicion.
III. JUDGING REASONABLENESS WITHOUT SUSPICION:
THE NEW PARADIGM
It might be argued that, regardless of the lack of textual support,
the presumptive suspicion requirement is well founded in practice
and tradition. Extensive support exists for this argument.211
However, this proposition, no matter how well founded in the past,
no longer represents a workable Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
in today’s world.
In the simpler world that existed at the nation’s founding,
suspicion was a useful mechanism for constraining governmental
power and discretion. As the decades marched on, however, our
world became increasingly complex and interconnected. Rural
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212. See Davies, Correcting History, supra note 15, at 181-94 (explaining that in the 1800s
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Original Fourth Amendment, supra note 10, at 634 (explaining that warrantless arrest
standards were relaxed in the nineteenth century “when crime and urban disorder emerged
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213. WILLIAM E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW: THE IMPACT OF LEGAL
CHANGE ON MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY, 1760-1830, at 1-2 (Univ. of Ga. Press 1994) (1975).
agricultural life gave way to an urban industrial existence as the
Industrial Revolution, and then the Second Industrial Revolution,
unfolded in the 1800s. Scholarship already has suggested how some
of these changes dramatically transformed both Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence and our views about legitimate governmental search
and seizure power.212 What has not been adequately discussed,
however, is that in this new world suspicion is incapable of per-
forming as extensive a protective function as it did at the nation’s
founding.
Judging Fourth Amendment reasonableness, usually in the
absence of suspicion, is the future. And the future is now. Using the
Fourth Amendment’s Reasonableness Clause as the constitutional
touchstone, and recognizing that suspicion is not necessarily at the
core of Fourth Amendment constitutionality, is demanded by
numerous developments, most prominently the reality of modern,
urban life as well as the consequences of technological advances; the
rise of the regulatory state; and the increased interest in preventa-
tive searches arising from the post-9/11 world. As I will discuss
below, our existing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, with its
myopic focus upon suspicion and its failure to develop alternative
protective mechanisms, is ill-suited to our new world.
A. Modern Urban Life and Technological Advancements
When assessing suspicion’s utility today as a primary mechanism
for protecting Fourth Amendment values, contrast the Framers’
world with our own. Initially, our country was primarily rural, and
our economy based largely upon small-scale agriculture, with
waterways providing the primary means of transportation.213 In
1760, what are now major cities—Philadelphia, New York, and
Boston—were little more than “large towns” with populations of
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217. See infra note 220.
218. See ADAMS, supra note 216, at 177 (“Real national product increased nearly
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219. Id. at 178.
220. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CENSUS 1990: SELECTED HISTORICAL DECENNIAL CENSUS
POPULATION AND HOUSING COUNTS, URBAN AND RURAL POPULATIONS, tbl.4, http://www.
census.gov/population/www/censusdata/files/table-4.pdf [hereinafter URBAN AND RURAL
POPULATIONS]; see also PETER N. STEARNS, THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION IN WORLD HISTORY
9 (3d ed. 2007) (“By 1850 there were still as many craft workers as factory workers and as
many rural people as urban.”). Exactly what Stearns meant when claiming that in 1850 there
were “as many rural people as urban” is unclear, as 1850 census data show a rural population
of 19.6 million and an urban population of only 3.57 million. URBAN AND RURAL POPULATIONS,
supra. In any case, in 1830 the rural population began a proportional decline that was
initially gradual but then (around 1890) rapidly accelerated, while the urban population
began to rapidly increase. Id.
merely 23,000, 18,000, and 16,000, respectively.214 In 1800, “80
percent of the American people” worked in agriculture.215 In the
period between 1820 and 1840, rural living continued to dom-
inate,216 though the balance started to shift in the mid-1800s.217
The Industrial Revolution’s advent in the 1800s was the primary
catalyst for these changes, leading to an astounding transformation
as industry blossomed, people switched from a rural agricultural life
to an urban industrial one, modern cities and industrial regions
developed, and transportation and communication dramatically
improved. The Framers’ agricultural world of the 1700s quickly gave
way to changes the Industrial Revolution wrought in the 1800s. And
peculiarly American advantages led to a second blossoming from the
Industrial Revolution by the end of the 1800s.218 “[I]t was during the
early 1880s that the United States became preponderantly an
industrial rather than an agricultural country. Also by 1880 or so,
it surpassed England as the world’s leading industrial power.”219
These developments led to an explosion in urban populations,
which increased from 201,655 in 1790, to 6.2 million in 1860, to 30.2
million in 1900, and 54.3 million in 1920.220 The move towards an
urban life is now entrenched, with the urban-rural divide being the
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224. Id.
225. See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
226. After 9/11, the Defense Department began planning to create what might be called a
super-duper metadatabase known as the Total Information Awareness program, “a computer
system that could create a vast electronic dragnet, searching for personal information as part
of the hunt for terrorists around the globe—including the United States.” John Markoff,
Pentagon Plans a Computer System That Would Peek at Personal Data of Americans, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 9, 2002, at A12; see also Jeffrey Rosen, Total Information Awareness, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 15, 2002 (Magazine), at 128. I use the term “metadatabase” because the system was
conceived to “provide intelligence analysts and law enforcement officials with instant access
to information from Internet mail and calling records to credit card and banking transactions
and travel documents, without a search warrant,” Markoff, supra, and also “financial,
opposite of what it was in the Framers’ time. In 1790, 5.1 percent of
the population lived in urban areas, while 94.9 percent lived in rural
locations.221 In 1810, this ratio remained nearly unchanged, with 7.3
percent living in urban areas, while 92.7 percent lived in rural
locations.222 By contrast, in 2000, 79 percent of the nation’s popula-
tion lived in urban centers.223 Only 21 percent lived in rural areas.224
These changes led to a tremendous transformation in our search
and seizure law.225
It is doubtful the Framers could have imagined the density or
other realities of our urban centers, but certainly they never could
have conceived of the technology that permeates such urban life. For
example, breathtaking technological advances, particularly since
the mid-1900s, and which accelerated in the late 1900s and into the
new twenty-first century, have continued to ease communications
across long distances and increased globalization. I am no longer
astounded when my taxi driver in New York City spends the entire
ride speaking to his brother through a mobile telephone when his
brother is in Bengal, halfway across the globe. Although this
isolated anecdote says nothing about Fourth Amendment jurispru-
dence, the communication advances that made the call possible have
enormous implications for the appropriate scope of the government’s
search power, as exemplified by post-9/11, high-tech controversies
such as the Department of Defense’s “Total Information Awareness”
program226 and the NSA’s domestic wiretapping program.227
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Clymer, New Name of Pentagon Data Sweep Focuses on Terror, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 2003, at
A20.
Governmental efforts to pursue the program in some form apparently continue. The New
York Times reported that a federal advisory committee found that “the Defense Department
and many other agencies were collecting and using ‘personally identifiable information on
U.S. persons for national security and law enforcement purposes,’” and that “[s]ome of these
activities ... resemble[d] the Pentagon program initially known as Total Information
Awareness.” Robert Pear, Panel Urges New Protection on Federal ‘Data Mining,’ N.Y. TIMES,
May 17, 2004, at A12; see also John Markoff, Taking Snooping Further: Government Looks at
Ways To Mine Databases, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2006, at C1.
For academic commentary about the Total Information Awareness program and similar
efforts, see Christopher Slobogin, Government Data Mining and the Fourth Amendment, 75
U. CHI. L. REV. 317, 317-20 (2008); Daniel J. Solove, Data Mining and the Security-Liberty
Debate, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 343, 343-44 (2008). Slobogin reports that a “fusion center
initiative ... appears to be the new TIA,” and “is operated by the Department of Homeland
Security.” Slobogin, supra, at 319. Fusion centers are “‘an amalgamation of commercial and
public sector resources for the purpose of optimizing the collection, analysis, and sharing of
information on individuals,’ designed to gather data about banking and finance, real estate,
education, retail sales, social services, transportation, postal and shipping, and hospitality
and lodging transactions.” Id. at 318 (quoting Lillie Coney, Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., Statement
to the Department of Homeland Security Data Privacy and Integrity Advisory Committee 1,
4 (2007), available at http://www.epic.org/privacy/fusion/fusion-dhs.pdf).
227. News coverage of the NSA’s controversial post-9/11 domestic wiretapping program,
formally known as the “Terrorist Surveillance Program,” has been extensive. See, e.g., Bush
Ends Warrantless Surveillance Program, FISA Court To Oversee Wiretaps on Terrorists, 75
U.S.L.W. 2423, 2424 (Jan. 23, 2007); Dan Eggen & Paul Kane, Gonzales Hospital Episode
Detailed: Ailing Ashcroft Pressured on Spy Program, Former Deputy Says, WASH. POST, May
16, 2007, at A1; Siobhan Gorman, NSA’s Domestic Spying Grows as Agency Sweeps up Data,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 10, 2008, at A1; Michael Isikoff, The Fed Who Blew the Whistle, NEWSWEEK,
Dec. 22, 2008, at 40, 42, 44-46; Eric Lichtblau & David Johnston, Court To Oversee U.S.
Wiretapping in Terror Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2007, at A1; Eric Lichtblau, Debate and
Protest at Spy Program’s Inception, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2008, at A19; Eric Lichtblau,
Gonzales Invokes Actions of Other Presidents in Defense of U.S. Spying, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25,
2006, at A19; Walter Pincus, Judge Discusses Details of Work on Secret Court: He Takes Issue
with NSA’s Wiretaps, WASH. POST, June 26, 2007, at A4; James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Extent
of E-Mail Surveillance Renews Concerns in Congress, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2009, at A1
(reporting that “critics in Congress [are] saying [that the NSA’s] recent intercepts of the pri-
vate telephone calls and e-mail messages of Americans are broader than previously acknowl-
edged”); Brian Ross et al., Exclusive: Inside Account of U.S. Eavesdropping on Americans, ABC
NEWS, Oct. 9, 2008, http://abcnews.go.com/blotter/story?id=5987804&page=1.
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For academic commentary, see Paul M. Schwartz, Reviving Telecommunications
Surveillance Law, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 287, 305-09 (2008). These post-9/11 events were not the
first time the NSA had found itself embroiled in controversy over domestic spying. See
Nicholas M. Horrock, N.S.A. Chief Tells of Broad Scope of Surveillance: Describes Scanning
of Calls and Cables of Foreign and U.S. Citizens and Groups, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1975, at A1.
228. See Arcila, The Framers’ Search Power, supra note 46 (reviewing civil search statutes
from the Framers’ era, and arguing that the Framers were more interested in protecting the
government’s search power than in protecting the people from it, which the Framers
accomplished by making probable cause an immunity standard and displacing the jury’s
traditional common law role in assessing whether probable cause had supported the search).
229. Arcila, Special Needs, supra note 16, at 1241.
230. Id.
In light of all these changes, we perpetuate doctrinal incoherence
by continuing to overemphasize suspicion in our Fourth Amendment
doctrinal formulations. Simply put, continuing to give suspicion
pride of place in our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence fails to
account for the massive societal and technological changes that have
occurred since the Framers’ era.
B. The Rise of the Regulatory State
Not only has modern urban life enveloped in technology affected
search and seizure law, but its impact has been magnified by the
rise of the regulatory state. The federal government had a highly
limited regulatory state during the first 100 years or so of the
nation’s history. The most prominent part of the regulatory state
was the customs service, which was charged with enforcing customs
duties, the primary source of governmental revenue at the nation’s
founding. Though this regulatory state had a small footprint, it
nonetheless holds important lessons about the Framers’ views on
search and seizure.228
The regulatory state’s development accelerated during the
Industrial Revolution, which “was viewed as causing or contributing
to important social problems in a manner that required its
management,” leading, for example, to the Interstate Commerce
Commission’s creation near the end of the 1880s.229 Significant
regulatory efforts followed in the antitrust and bankruptcy
contexts.230 All these developments likewise had important implica-
tions for the Fourth Amendment. An 1886 decision, Boyd v. United
States, held that Fourth and Fifth Amendment protections pre-
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231. 116 U.S. 616, 618-33 (1886).
232. Arcila, Special Needs, supra note 16, at 1241.
233. Id. at 1242.
234. MATTHEW DUROSE ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
SPECIAL REPORT, CONTACTS BETWEEN POLICE AND THE PUBLIC, 2005, at 2 (2007),
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpp05.pdf.
235. Id. “The most common reason for contact was as a driver during a traffic stop,
accounting for about 4 out of 10 contacts.... The second most frequent reason for contact with
police was to report a crime or problem, accounting for about 1 in every 4 contacts.” Id. at 3.
236. One commentator on this Article wondered whether these contact numbers included
telephone contacts, such as 911 calls, which would not have resulted in plain view searches.
That is not the case. The contacts had to result in plain view searches because only face-to-
face contacts are included. Id. at 10 (explaining that the number of contacts derives from a
survey in which “[r]espondents ... were directly interviewed to determine how many had a
face-to-face contact with police during the previous 12 months”); see also id. at 1 (referring to
“the 43.5 million persons who had face-to-face contact with police”); id. at 2 (“The total
number of contacts was 71.1 million, with an average of 1.6 face-to-face contacts per
resident.”); id. at 3 (“Survey respondents who had face-to-face contact with police were asked
to describe the nature of the contact.”).
vented the government from compelling the production of docu-
ments during an in rem forfeiture proceeding,231 and thus provided
a significant shield against these regulatory regimes.232 The Court’s
eventual rejection of Boyd represented the “end of substantive
Fourth Amendment limits on the government’s regulatory power,”
which “helped make the modern regulatory state possible.”233
Since these developments, the modern regulatory state has
exploded. Before we consider its magnitude, let us first focus upon
criminal law enforcement, as the comparison between the two will
be instructive. For present purposes, I will include within criminal
law enforcement both the federal and state governments. The
federal government reports that 43.5 million persons had contact
with police in 2005.234 Because nearly 30 percent of these individu-
als had more than one contact with police, the total number of police
contacts in 2005 is estimated at 71.1 million.235 This is only an
extremely rough barometer of the extent to which the federal and
state governments conducted searches during 2005 for traditional
law enforcement purposes, but it is a meaningful one given that
each of these contacts resulted in at least a plain view search of the
person.236 Moreover, other indicia do not appear to significantly
increase the rate of traditional criminal searches. For example,
United States magistrates issued 34,246 search warrants in 2005,
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237. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE STATISTICS, DUTIES PERFORMED BY MAGISTRATE JUDGES IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS
(2007), http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t1842007.pdf (last visited Feb. 11, 2010).
238. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Transp. Statistics, 2005 Domestic
Airline Passenger Traffic up 4.1 Percent from 2004, at 1 (Mar. 16, 2006), available at
http://www.bts.gov/press_releases/2006/bts013_06/pdf/bts013_06.pdf. The 660 million
passenger number is roughly commensurate with subsequent years for which data is
available. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Transp. Statistics, December 2008
Airline Traffic Data: System Traffic down 5.7 Percent in December from 2007 and down 3.7
Percent in 2008, at 3 (Mar. 12, 2009), available at http://www.bts.gov/press_releases/
2009/bts012_09/pdf/bts012 _09.pdf (“U.S. airlines carried 649.9 million scheduled domestic
passengers in 2008, down 4.3 percent from the 679.2 million carried in 2007 and the fewest
annual domestic passengers since 2004 ....”).
239. See 49 U.S.C. § 44901(a) (2006). Federal regulations have implemented these
screening procedures. See 49 C.F.R. §§ 1544.201(b), 1540.107, 1544.203(c), 1544.205(b),
1544.207 (2008). Aviation screening procedures have repeatedly been upheld against Fourth
Amendment challenges. See, e.g., United States v. Hartwell, 436 F.3d 174 (3d Cir. 2006);
United States v. Marquez, 410 F.3d 612 (9th Cir. 2005); Singleton v. Comm’r, 606 F.2d 50 (3d
Cir. 1979).
240. A USDA subunit, the Food Safety and Inspection Service, is granted search authority
to oversee meat, poultry, and egg products. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 603(a), 608 (2006); 9 C.F.R.
§§ 201.95, 302.1, 300.6 (2008). Another subunit, the Grain Inspection, Packers and Stockyards
Administration, is authorized to inspect stockyards, market agencies, dealers, and packers.
See 7 U.S.C. § 228 (2006); 9 C.F.R. § 201.95 (2008). Additionally, the Animal and Plant Health
Inspection Service is granted search authority to enforce the Animal Welfare Act. See 7 U.S.C.
§§ 2146, 2147 (2006); 9 C.F.R. § 2.126 (2008).
241. See 29 U.S.C. § 657 (2006); 29 C.F.R. §§ 1903.3, 1926.3 (2008); Marshall v. Barlow’s,
Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 313-24 (1978) (holding that, as applied, § 657’s warrantless search
32,467 in 2006, and 33,632 in 2007.237 These numbers do not
appreciably increase the rate of criminal searches if we presume
that at least 71.1 million criminal searches occurred in 2005.
Now return to the regulatory state. Even when limiting our in-
quiry to the federal government, the degree of interaction between
the person and the civil regulatory apparatus is monumental, and
the vast majority of such civil searches are both warrantless and
suspicionless. Perhaps the best example is that during 2005
“airlines carried 660 million domestic passengers,”238 all of whom
had to subject themselves and their baggage to warrantless and
suspicionless civil searches as they passed through airport
security.239 Add to this the myriad other ways in which individuals
and businesses are subject to civil searches, which also are usu-
ally both warrantless and suspicionless—from inspections by the
United States Department of Agriculture240 to the United States
Occupational Safety and Health Administration241 to the Food and
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authorization violated the Fourth Amendment; allowing use of administrative warrants that
comply with Camara and See, see supra notes 32-47 and accompanying text; and preserving
warrantless search authority for closely regulated industries).
242. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 374(a)(1), (f), (g); 21 C.F.R. §§ 600.21, 806.30; Wedgewood Village
Pharmacy, Inc. v. United States, 421 F.3d 263, 273 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that no warrant
is required under § 374(a), and that “refusing a legitimate inspection request is a criminal
violation of the [Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act]”); United States v. New England Grocers
Supply Co., 488 F. Supp. 230, 237-39 (D. Mass. 1980) (finding warrantless searches
constitutional if FDA agents have “reason to suspect violations of the [Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act] so long as the searches were otherwise reasonable” under the Act).
243. See Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971); Sanchez v. County of San Diego, 464 F.3d
916 (9th Cir. 2006), reh’g en banc denied, 483 F.3d 965 (9th Cir. 2007).
Drug Administration,242 or to welfare home inspections243—and two
truths become clear. First, the modern regulatory state is a constant
presence in our daily lives. By comparison, we are only rarely
subjected to searches for criminal law enforcement purposes.
Second, unlike in the criminal law enforcement context, neither
warrants nor prior suspicion can provide workable protections
against governmental civil searches because in many—probably
most—instances they would fatally undermine the regulatory
regime.
C. The Post-9/11 World
In addition to the modern regulatory state’s rise, the 9/11
terrorist attacks have placed tremendous stress upon our Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. For some time prior to 9/11, we were
confronting the challenge of guarding against attack by nongov-
ernmental actors who would probe our every vulnerability. The 9/11
attacks were a terrible demonstration of the tremendous injury that
such actors can inflict. Added to this concern are the myriad ways
in which we have created a world in which the potential for
wrecking havoc exists. Consider biological or chemical attacks
against targets as varied as ports or the food supply, or technologi-
cal attacks against computer systems that could be aimed at basic
infrastructure like the electrical grid.
These threats caused the George W. Bush presidential adminis-
tration to engage in wide-ranging reforms and initiatives, many of
which were highly controversial and of dubious constitutionality,
including on Fourth Amendment grounds. These included: (1) the
Defense Department’s Total Information Awareness Program, which
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244. See supra note 226.
245. See Arcila, Fourth Amendment Chutzpah, supra note 13, at 1239 & nn.33-36.
246. See supra note 227; see also Arcila, Fourth Amendment Chutzpah, supra note 13, at
1237-38 & n.30.
247. See supra Part II.C.
appears to continue to exist in a balkanized form;244 (2) investigatory
initiatives using the USA PATRIOT Act;245 and (3) the NSA
domestic wiretapping program.246
Each of these efforts resulted from pressure to engage in preven-
tative searches, and from the reality that technological advances
could be helpful in doing so. Such pressure could not meaningfully
be resisted, certainly from a political perspective. And these efforts
also had something else in common: an abandonment of the prior
suspicion requirement, or at least the type of suspicion that would
serve to safeguard either the search target in a manner consistent
with traditional Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, or others who
might be caught up in a dragnet. And in each of these instances, the
abandonment of such prior suspicion was necessary to serving the
goals of each program. While the merits of these programs are
debatable, the dynamic that they represent— preventative searches
in which prior suspicion is abandoned or limited—will continue.
How Fourth Amendment jurisprudence will respond is a crucial
issue of our time.
CONCLUSION
Fourth Amendment law is at a crossroads. We have been heading
in this direction for quite some time, and if we had not yet arrived,
the pressure that post-9/11 controversies have placed upon our
constitutional search and seizure law would have brought us
hurtling to that juncture. Regardless of one’s Fourth Amendment
views about the various federal responses to 9/11, it should be clear
to all that a suspicion-based regime is unworkable. Even if one is
of the view that suspicion has been more of an absolute Fourth
Amendment requirement, rather than merely a proxy (as I
contend),247 that view does not support applying such a requirement
now. A suspicion requirement made sense in the Framers’ time,
when life was mostly rural and agricultural, and there was a small
regulatory state. But now that governmental power includes large,
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248. This is because, in the Fourth Amendment, only the Warrant Clause contains any
reference to suspicion, indirectly through its invocation of probable cause. See supra note 50
and accompanying text.
249. See supra Part II.B.
250. See Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. L. REV. 503
(2007) (arguing that no unifying Fourth Amendment theory is possible given the different
objectives Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is meant to serve).
251. Alessandro Acquisti et al., The Impact of Relative Judgements on Concern About
Privacy (working paper to be submitted for publication) (demonstrating that conceptions of
privacy are mutable and context-dependent).
professionalized police forces, when urban life has created a greater
interest in expanded policing and hence search powers, and with the
rise of the regulatory state and the increasing interest in preventa-
tive searches in a post-9/11 world, a presumptive suspicion require-
ment must be abandoned because it is simply unworkable.
Another reason for putting the so-called presumptive suspicion
requirement behind us is that this ill-advised focus upon suspicion
has had unfavorable consequences for our Fourth Amendment civil
search jurisprudence. The focus on suspicion, for example, has
caused us to concentrate upon the Warrant Clause.248 But this focus
has run us off the tracks, causing us to iterate an improperly
formulated rule that is both historically questionable,249 as well as
presently unworkable. Worse, our Fourth Amendment jurispru-
dence continues to mouth adherence to a presumptive suspicion
requirement though the rule is demonstrably wrong and, worse yet,
leads to results patently at odds with Fourth Amendment protected
interests. Moreover, our focus upon suspicion has not only led us
astray in terms of the black letter rules we have developed, it
has obscured the urgency with which we need to reform our civil
search jurisprudence to adequately protect all Fourth Amendment
interests.
We would be better served by a new Fourth Amendment jurispru-
dence. Because the Fourth Amendment today covers all govern-
mental search activity, it may be an unmanageable task to seek
complete coherence.250 Another such obstacle is that privacy is
central to the Fourth Amendment, but research increasingly
suggests that it is too unstable a concept on which to found a search
and seizure jurisprudence upon which consensus will exist.251
The law in other contexts that are similarly, if not more, complex
has sought to provide guidance about constitutionality in a man-
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252. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). Justice Jackson’s
concurring opinion set forth a tripartite framework for judging the constitutionality of
presidential actions. He proposed that the legality of the President’s action depends upon the
specific situation: (1) an action likely would be upheld if the Constitution expressly granted
power to the President, or to Congress to authorize it, and the action fell within explicit or
implied statutory power; (2) if an action contradicted Congress’s express or implied policy, it
likely would be invalid, unless based upon a constitutional grant of exclusive power to the
President that was beyond Congress’s power to limit or regulate; and (3) an action could be
upheld in the absence of a congressional grant or denial of authority, based upon independent
executive power when concurrent or uncertain power exists; in this category, congressional
indifference or acquiescence may be determinative. Id. at 635-38 (Jackson, J., concurring).
ner that perhaps has been more helpful. One example that comes
to mind is the jurisprudence regarding presidential power that
derives from Justice Jackson’s famous concurring opinion in the
Youngstown Steel case.252 Perhaps a new search jurisprudence
that formulates such broad principles would be helpful in the
Fourth Amendment context. Indeed, it might be the best we can do
in light of all the varying and competing interests that the Fourth
Amendment is asked to serve.
In that spirit, I offer the following guidelines, which would more
accurately reflect a proper formulation of Fourth Amendment law
than many of our current black letter formulations, such as the
presumptive warrant or suspicion requirements.
Reasonableness: All governmental searches must be reasonable, in
conformance with the Fourth Amendment’s Reasonableness Clause.
This foundational guideline emphasizes that the Reasonableness
Clause, not the Warrant Clause, is the constitutional touchstone.
Thus, it overrules all the various iterations of the warrant prefer-
ence requirement.
Oversight: An unconstrained governmental search power is more
likely unconstitutional, while a government search power that is
constrained through oversight by another governmental branch is
more likely constitutional. Oversight possibilities include legislative
oversight through statutory or regulatory guidelines, as well as
judicial oversight through preclearance, such as through the use of
warrants, judicial orders, subpoenas, and, of course, ex post judicial
review of challenged searches. This guideline is important because
it emphasizes the importance of checks and balances in search and
seizure law. Current Fourth Amendment law advances this interest
through the presumptive warrant requirement, which is justified
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253. See Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 354 (1972); Johnson v. United States,
333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948).
254. Whether ex ante or ex post oversight is preferable, as an abstract matter, has been
explored. See Stuntz, supra note 24, at 881-98.
255. See id. at 910-18, 941-42.
256. See, e.g., Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 702-04 (2009) (holding that the
exclusionary rule is not available to remedy police recordkeeping error that is merely
negligent); Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 590-99 (2006) (ruling that exclusion is not an
available remedy for violation of the knock-and-announce rule).
257. Numerous cases allow warrants to issue on less than probable cause. See supra notes
34-43 and accompanying text (discussing Camara); see also Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436
U.S. 307, 320-21 (1978).
258. The Supreme Court has in the past properly identified this principle, though ironically
it did so in a case that famously limited the use of search warrants. See Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 20 (1968) (“[T]he police must, whenever practicable, obtain advance judicial approval
of searches and seizures through the warrant procedure....”). Professor Bradley also has
correctly identified this principle. Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment,
83 MICH. L. REV. 1468, 1471 (1985) (describing one model as “a warrant is always required
in part by its consequence of placing a “neutral and detached”
magistrate between the government and the search target.253 This
guideline is preferable because, while emphasizing the crucial need
of oversight, it allows greater flexibility by recognizing that over-
sight can exist through mechanisms other than warrants, and
because it is grounded in the Reasonableness Clause, while the
presumptive warrant requirement is grounded in the Warrant
Clause.
Judicial Preclearance: Where practicable, governmental searches
should be subject to preclearance by the judiciary, preferably in the
form of a warrant, which must always be supported by probable
cause in conformance with the Fourth Amendment’s Warrant Clause,
or alternatively through a judicial order or judicial subpoena. This
guideline is a corollary to the preceding one. It is included to
emphasize that ex ante oversight is preferable to ex post
oversight,254 and that judicial oversight is preferable to legislative
oversight. It is justified because preclearance becomes more
important as the exclusionary rule is increasingly limited,255 as has
been occurring.256 Also, this guideline would overrule cases allowing
warrants based on less than probable cause, such as Camara and
others.257 The guideline is preferable to the current presumptive
warrant rule for at least two reasons. First, it is a more honest
description of search warrants’ role in Fourth Amendment law than
the presumptive warrant requirement.258 The guideline states that
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for every search and seizure when it is practicable to obtain one”).
259. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 663 (1995); Skinner v. Ry. Labor
Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 629 n.9 (1989); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S.
543, 556 n.12 (1976).
260. 469 U.S. 325, 342 (1985) (holding that a student search “will be permissible in its
scope when the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and
not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the
infraction”).
warrants are to be used “when practicable.” This is considerably
more accurate than claiming they are presumptively required,
which leads to the inaccurate inference that warrantless searches
are unconstitutional. Second, the guideline emphasizes—again more
accurately—that preclearance is not limited to the warrant pro-
cedure, but may also occur through alternatives such as judicial
orders or subpoenas.
Suspicion: A governmental search power that is not subject to ex
ante oversight by another governmental branch is more likely
unconstitutional if unsupported by some level of suspicion, and more
likely constitutional if supported by some level of suspicion. This is
a more honest formulation of suspicion’s role in Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence than our current presumptive suspicion rule. Under
this guideline, suspicion will still play an important role, but the
guideline’s flexibility acknowledges that we cannot depend upon
suspicion or probable cause to do the brunt of the work in protecting
Fourth Amendment interests. Needless to say, difficulty will still
exist in identifying the appropriate level of suspicion that should
apply in particular contexts.
Proportionality: A governmental search power that is more intru-
sive than necessary is more likely unconstitutional; a governmental
search power that is closely proportional to the degree of harm to be
avoided or investigated is more likely constitutional. This is not a
least restrictive means test, in acknowledgment of the Supreme
Court’s hostility to such a test,259 but the guideline does crucially
emphasize that Fourth Amendment jurisprudence must prefer some
level of proportionality between a search’s intrusiveness and the
governmental interest at stake. This principle is implicit in some
Fourth Amendment cases, such as New Jersey v. T.L.O.260 and Terry
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261. 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (ruling that a level of suspicion lower than probable cause—namely,
reasonable suspicion—justifies an investigatory stop and frisk since it is a limited warrantless
intrusion); see also Christopher Slobogin, Let’s Not Bury Terry: A Call for Rejuvenation of the
Proportionality Principle, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1053 (1998).
262. See Slobogin, supra note 261, at 1054 (advocating for adoption of “the proportionality
principle,” under which “[a] search or seizure is reasonable if the strength of its justification
is roughly proportionate to the level of intrusion associated with police action,” and clarifying
that it should be “extended ... to the entire Fourth Amendment universe”).
263. See Ricardo J. Bascuas, Fourth Amendment Lessons from the Highway and the
Subway: A Principled Approach to Suspicionless Searches, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 719, 761-69 (2007)
(describing the DEA’s “Operation Pipeline,” a program to train state and local police to
leverage traffic stops by seeking consent to search); Robert H. Whorf, “Coercive Ambiguity”
in the Routine Traffic Stop Turned Consent Search, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 379, 389-90 (1997);
Thomas, supra note 10, at 1505-06; see also supra note 235 (noting that the most common
reason for contact with police is a traffic stop).
264. See Timothy P. O’Neill, Vagrants in Volvos: Ending Pretextual Traffic Stops and
Consent Searches of Vehicles in Illinois, 40 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 745, 747, 773 (2009).
265. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
266. Id. at 227.
267. 519 U.S. 33 (1996).
268. Id. at 35, 39-40.
269. E.g., Christo Lassiter, Eliminating Consent from the Lexicon of Traffic Stop
Interrogations, 27 CAP. U. L. REV. 79, 82-83 (1998); Marcy Strauss, Reconstructing Consent,
92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 211, 258-71 (2001); Thomas, supra note 10, at 1505-13.
v. Ohio,261 but it is sufficiently fundamental that it needs to be made
explicit throughout the entirety of Fourth Amendment law.262
Consent: Consent will justify a governmental search only if it was
both knowing and voluntary; knowingness can be satisfied by
providing advance notice that consent may be refused. This is a very
important guideline in terms of the reality of day-to-day life, as
governmental authorities often search pursuant to consent,263 and
considerable evidence suggests that they often engage in perni-
cious racial targeting while doing so.264 The guideline would over-
rule Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,265 in which the Supreme Court
held that consent to search need be only voluntary, not knowing.266
Additionally, it would make Ohio v. Robinette,267 which held that
there is no requirement that police inform a subject that he or she
is free to leave before a consent search may be deemed voluntary,268
much less important. Numerous commentators have called for a
prophylactic standard under which consent searches would be
unconstitutional.269 This guideline does not go so far. It still allows
consent to justify a search, but, crucially, only if the search target
is aware of the right to refuse.
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As I hope is clear from these guidelines, my advocacy for a
Reasonableness Clause approach to the Fourth Amendment, and
my criticisms of the presumptive warrant and suspicion require-
ments, are not meant to argue for the replacement of current Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence with one that gives priority to govern-
mental or law enforcement priorities. To the contrary, my guidelines
are meant to suggest that, in reevaluating our approach to the
Fourth Amendment, its core concepts—limitation of governmental
discretion, restrictions on governmental power for the protection of
individuals—should continue to guide us.
In the new Fourth Amendment jurisprudence I envision, war-
rants will continue to play a role, as will suspicion. But other
important and useful concepts will also explicitly take their place
in the jurisprudence, with the benefit of forcing courts to consider
the full panoply of protected Fourth Amendment interests. A large
problem with current Fourth Amendment law is that it veers wildly
between two opposing poles—the strict application of the presump-
tive warrant or suspicion requirements on one hand, and effectively
unconstrained balancing through a totality-of-the-circumstances
approach in the other. The guidelines suggested above serve as one
possible antidote to this bipolar jurisprudence by offering a middle
road of guided discretion.
Reformulating our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence will be a
daunting task. No doubt, even my broad proposals above will be
subject to vociferous criticisms from many quarters. One can
certainly question whether the effort is worthwhile. Though I have
identified above some areas of Fourth Amendment law that would
change, it may well be that courts applying such guidelines would
keep muddling about in their Fourth Amendment decisions. There
can be no guarantee of greater Fourth Amendment coherence if such
guidelines are followed, at least in terms of case results. But
hopefully a revamped Fourth Amendment would at least result in
greater coherence in the doctrine by which we order our affairs and
formulate our expectations about the legitimate scope of the
governmental search authority to which we are subjected.

